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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Heather Wolford 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of International Studies 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Sowing the Seeds of Resistance:  Agrarian Reform, Political Violence, and Popular 
Mobilization in the Aguán Valley of Honduras 
 
 
The agrarian conflict in the Aguán Valley of Honduras is among the most violent 
and distressing in contemporary Latin America.  It has roots in both local and global 
political economic processes, including structural adjustment and the proliferation of 
neoliberal economic policies in the region.  In particular, the Ley de Modernización y 
Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola, or Law of Modernization and Development of the 
Agricultural Sector, drastically altered the landscape in rural Honduras, both literally and 
figuratively.  An analysis of this policy reveals much about the nature of the current 
conflict, as well as that of the campesino (small farmer) movements that have organized to 
regain their land.  This thesis seeks to shed light on the interconnectedness of economic 
policy, political violence, and popular resistance in the Aguán Valley and to examine the 
ways in which campesino movements frame their struggles and assert themselves as 
legitimate actors in the policy realm.    
v 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Heather Wolford 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
   
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Master of Arts, International Studies, 2014, University of Oregon 
 Master of Public Administration, 2014, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, Anthropology, 2008, University of Oregon 
  
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Social Movements in Latin America 
 Political Violence 
 Political Economy 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
 Teaching Assistant, Department of International Studies, University of Oregon, 
 2013-2014 
  
 Research Assistant, Center for Latino/a and Latin American Studies, University of 
 Oregon, 2011-2013 
  
 Research Assistant, Knight Library Special Collections and University Archives, 
 University of Oregon, 2010-2011 
   
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
 Summer Graduate Research Award, Global Oregon Institute, 2012 
 
 Thurber Graduate Award, International Studies, 2012 
 
 Travel Grant, Department of Planning, Public Policy and Management, 2011 and 
2012  
 
 Catalyst Award, Department of Planning, Public Policy and Management, 2011  
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professors Yvonne Braun, Kristin 
Yarris, and Laura Leete for their assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. All three 
have inspired me to think about this project in different and exciting ways, and this work is 
all the richer for it. Working closely with my advisor and chair, Yvonne, throughout this 
process has been tremendously rewarding, and I am infinitely grateful for her insight and 
support. I also thank the Departments of International Studies and Planning, Public Policy 
and Management, as well as the Global Oregon Institute, for generously funding my 
fieldwork.  I must also give thanks for my family and wonderful friends, who have 
provided unconditional support in all my personal, professional and academic endeavors.  I 
am particularly lucky to have parents who have always encouraged me to chase my dreams 
– cliché as it might be – and I have no illusions that I could be where I am today without 
them.  Finally, and most importantly, I extend my most sincere gratitude to my compañeras 
and compañeros in Honduras, who have graciously welcomed me into their homes and 
communities, allowing me to walk with them, learn from them, and to be a very small part 
of their struggles for justice.  These have been the most meaningful experiences of my life, 
and I will forever be grateful.  ¡La lucha sigue! 
  
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the martyrs of the Aguán. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
 Statement of the Problem ....................................................................................... 1 
 Significance of Study ............................................................................................. 3 
 The Contemporary Context.................................................................................... 6 
 Methodology .......................................................................................................... 17 
Thesis Structure ..................................................................................................... 24 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...................... 25 
 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 25 
 Neoliberal Policy and Structural Adjustment ........................................................ 26 
 Neoliberalism as a Political Project ....................................................................... 30 
Land in the Neoliberal Context .............................................................................. 34 
Competing Models of Agrarian Reform ................................................................ 37 
 Political Violence ................................................................................................... 43 
 Social Movements .................................................................................................. 48 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 52 
  
ix 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
III. LA LEY DE MODERNIZACIÓN Y DESARROLLO DEL SECTOR 
AGRÍCOLA:  A POLICY ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 54 
 
 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 54 
 Problem Definition and Policy Approach .............................................................. 57 
The LMDSA and Agrarian Reform ....................................................................... 61 
Outcomes of La Ley de Modernización ................................................................. 63 
Outcomes in the Long-Term .................................................................................. 74 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 76 
IV. FROM THE FIELDS TO THE STREETS:  CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS 
IN THE AGUÁN ......................................................................................................... 79 
 
 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 79 
 Understanding the Movements via Political Process ............................................. 82 
 Framing Processes ................................................................................................. 83 
 Political Opportunities and Threats ....................................................................... 97 
 Mobilizing Structures and Resources .................................................................... 107 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 111 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 113 
Moving Forward .................................................................................................... 117 
Recommendations and Final Thoughts .................................................................. 120 
APPENDIX: CONSECUENCIAS DE LA LEY DE MODERNIZACIÓN .................... 122 
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................ 123 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Palm trees as far as the eye can see.  This description would often conjure up 
romantic images of dense jungle or rugged tropical beaches.   These palms, however, 
have a different story to tell.  Planted in neat rows that span tens of thousands of acres, 
they constitute the agro-industrial African palm plantations that cover the north coast of 
Honduras.  While at first glance this landscape may seem innocuous enough, these palms 
stand on grounds that are at the center of a struggle for land that has become increasingly 
fierce in recent years.  These palms have concealed acts of violence and clandestine 
graves.  They have absorbed blood spilled from both sides of this conflict.  These palms 
have also borne witness to the emergence of popular movements that have organized in 
defense of their rights to land and food sovereignty.  They have seen new generations of 
men and women rise up in resistance to political repression, and to risk their lives to work 
for justice in their communities.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
The agrarian conflict in the Aguán Valley of Honduras is among the most violent 
and distressing in contemporary Latin America.  At the time of this writing, more than 
one hundred and twenty five individuals, primarily members of campesino (peasant) 
organizations, have been assassinated in this region since the 2009 coup d’état.  Many 
hundreds more have been attacked, threatened, or otherwise intimidated.  Communities 
have been forcefully displaced and burnt to the ground, and countless families have lost 
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their homes and livelihoods.  Although the United Nations, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, and several other national and international human rights 
organizations have denounced this violence, it continues unabated.   
The rich agricultural land of the Aguán Valley is at the heart of this conflict.  The 
points of contention center around questions of who in fact owns this land, how it should 
be distributed, and for what purposes it should be used.  The conflict has emerged 
between several members of the agro-industrial elite, who currently hold or claim to hold 
title to a vast majority of the land in this region, and more than a hundred thousand local 
campesinos1 who argue that this land is rightfully theirs.  Citing the constitutional 
mandate for agrarian reform, the campesinos argue that they have been forcefully 
dispossessed of their land in illegal and violent ways, and over roughly the last decade 
they have organized into new popular movements in order to reclaim this land.  These 
movements have employed a wide range of strategies and tactics in this struggle, and 
have been met with extreme levels of violence from both the private landowners and the 
state. 
A number of factors have contributed to this conflict in some way.  A history of 
problematic land tenure and titling policies in Honduras is relevant, as families and 
communities commonly lack legal title to lands they have occupied for generations.  The 
government has made several attempts at agrarian reform since the 1960s, but ongoing 
political instability has precluded the possibility for comprehensive and lasting change.  
More recently, the dominance of neoliberal economic policies and influence of the World 
                                                 
1 I use the term “campesino” in this thesis (as opposed to the English translation “peasant”), as the term 
holds particular significance in terms of ideology and identity in the Latin American context, and as 
“peasant” often carries negative and disempowering connotations associated with poverty and 
“backwardness” in Western society.  For more on these theoretical distinctions, see Boyer (2003) and 
Loker (1996), among others. 
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Bank and other multinational lending institutions has shaped the nature of land reform in 
Honduras, shifting the emphasis from redistribution of public and idle lands to landless 
families to the establishment of land markets, individual property rights, and the 
promotion of industrial agriculture, ultimately resulting in a greater number of landless 
families after this period of reforms than before (Brockett 1998).  Perhaps more than 
ever, the questions of whose right to land counts most – that of the campesinos or of the 
elite agriculturalists – is at the forefront of this struggle.  The June 2009 ouster of 
President Manuel Zelaya, who was set to enact progressive land reforms when he was 
violently deposed from office, along with the subsequent regimes’ militarization of the 
Aguán and inaction in response to violence directed toward campesinos at the hands of 
landowners’ private security forces, point toward the favoring of the latter.  
Significance of Study 
To understand the contemporary conflict in the Aguán, we must consider several 
historical, political, and economic factors.  As such, my research aims to shed light on the 
interconnectedness of land reform policies, state-sponsored and state-sanctioned violence, 
and popular resistance in the Aguán Valley of Honduras.  I argue that the current conflict 
in the Aguán is primarily rooted in the failure of neoliberal policies of agrarian reform in 
Honduras, which are embodied in the Ley de Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector 
Agrícola (Law of Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector, or 
LMDSA).  These policies have been accompanied by widespread political violence on a 
level not seen in decades.  In response, local activists and campesino organizations are 
engaged in active resistance, the nature of which is largely influenced by this context.  
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This thesis explores the dynamics of these phenomena, and seeks to understand the ways 
in which these social movement actors mobilize and leverage pressure to create social 
change.  It also locates this conflict within broader historical and global political 
economic contexts, in order to understand the many forces at play in shaping the 
contemporary situation. 
While this struggle is important in its own right, it also has significant 
implications for scholars and practitioners interested in land issues, popular movements, 
and social justice, both in Honduras and beyond.  This is a story we have seen before, 
where power is concentrated in the hands of a few who employ violent means to protect 
their political and economic interests.  It is a story all too common to the people of Latin 
America, where popular movements have been repeatedly suppressed by corrupt 
governments and powerful oligarchies.  However, it is also a story of the power of 
resistance and the passion with which individuals, communities, and social movements 
fight for justice against all odds. 
Key Questions and Arguments 
Several questions guide this research.  How has the history of agrarian reform in 
Honduras shaped this contemporary struggle?  How does land reform policy differently 
impact campesinos and the elite in this context?  What are the relationships between the 
militarization in this region and elite interests?  Does this case support or challenge 
arguments favoring neoliberal or “market-led” agrarian reform?  How are local 
campesinos and activists resisting the political violence in this region?  In what ways 
does an examination of these particular movements help us understand the constraints 
that social movements face when working in the context of a highly repressive state, as 
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well as the political opportunities and resources available to movements in today’s 
globalized world? 
More specifically, this thesis seeks to respond to the following research questions: 
 What are the effects of the Ley de Modernización in contemporary Honduras, and 
in what ways has this policy shaped the ongoing conflict in the Aguán? 
 How do popular (campesino) movements in the Aguán frame and articulate their 
struggles, both on national and international scales?   
 In what ways are these campesino movements asserting themselves in the policy 
realm?  
 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the current conflict in the Aguán is rooted in both a 
specific policy (the LMDSA) and the general nature of contemporary global capitalism 
and development discourse.  The latter’s focus on commodification of land and natural 
resources, private ownership of the means of production, and market-based solutions to 
social problems such as poverty and landlessness have only served to exacerbate 
entrenched social inequality in this region and beyond.  Further, the LMDSA failed to 
actually address the limitations of previous agrarian reform programs or the structural 
causes of landlessness, and was instead part of a thinly-veiled project to consolidate the 
political and economic power of elites in Honduras. 
 I also present an analysis of campesino movements in the Aguán.  Here, I argue 
that understanding the nature of these movements, their contention, and the context in 
which they operate requires an approach that is both historically deep and conceptually 
broad.   I further contend that we must consider culturalist, structuralist, and materialist 
concerns and conditions in order to fully appreciate the complexity of this struggle.  
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There is much to be learned from these sophisticated movements – both in terms of this 
particular conflict, and in our broader understandings of how social movements function 
within the context of a highly repressive state in today’s globalized world.  As the context 
in which this conflict occurs is central to the analysis that follows, I turn now to a 
discussion of the political and social landscape of contemporary Honduras. 
The Contemporary Context 
 The struggle in the Aguán is emblematic of many of the problems that 
communities in Honduras face today, and is just one of many conflicts that can be traced 
to the process of economic neoliberalization and the strains that the global capitalist 
system inflicts on local communities.  As elsewhere, local desires to protect land, culture, 
and ways of life are often subjugated by the needs of capital accumulation and the 
encroachment of multinational corporations.  Communities across Honduras are currently 
resisting capitalist and imperialist expansion, which manifests in such forms as resource 
extraction projects (particularly mines, hydroelectric dams, and logging), the 
establishment of expanded free trade zones (referred to as ZEDEs – Zones of 
Employment and Economic and Social Development, or Zonas de Empleado y 
Desarrollo Económico y Social), the grabbing of coastal lands by large-scale tourism 
developers (primarily in Afro-indigenous Garifuna territory and campesino lands around 
the Gulf of Fonseca), the further expansion of industrial monocrop agriculture, and the 
increased presence of the U.S. military in Honduras (under the guise of fighting the War 
on Drugs), among other things.  These communities are often met with violence 
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perpetrated by those whose interests are being furthered by these projects – i.e. the state 
and the Honduran elite. 
 Violence permeates Honduran society in various forms, and is largely blamed on 
gangs and narcotraffickers, as well as the presence of hundreds of thousands of firearms 
that remain from the Central American wars of the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s.  Alarmingly, 
Honduras has held the highest murder rate in the world each year since 2010.  That year, 
Honduras surpassed El Salvador to claim the dubious distinction, as Honduras’s rate rose 
substantially from the 2009 figure of 70.7 homicides per 100,000 residents to 82.1, while 
El Salvador’s rate fell from 70.9 to 66 in the same period (UNODC 2011).  The rate then 
rose again to an astonishing 91.61 in 2011, and fell slightly to 83.83 in 2012 (OAS 2014).  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports the 2012 rate at a 
significantly higher 90.4 (2014).  For 2013, the figure was reported alternatively as 79.7 
homicides per 100,000 by the National Autonomous University of Honduras’s 
Observatory on Violence (La Prensa, February 14, 2014) and 75.1 by the National Police 
(El Heraldo, January 2, 2014).  However, as Kaitlin Owens of the University of Toronto’s 
International Human Rights Program notes, the apparent decrease in these rates in recent 
years does not actually represent a decrease in the number of homicides but rather an 
increase in population (2014, 12).  While the exact figures vary slightly by source, what 
has remained constant is that Honduras’s homicide rate has been significantly higher than 
that of every other country in the world.   
 While gang and drug related violence are certainly serious issues in Honduras, 
much of the violence plaguing the nation is instead attributable to the new wave of 
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political violence that has gripped the nation for the past five years.  In this time, 
Honduras has become one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists, 
lawyers, and human rights defenders, in addition to the local activists asserting 
themselves in the struggles mentioned above.  Following several years of relative 
political calm and improvements in the lives of many Hondurans, a major turning point 
occurred in the early hours of a June morning in 2009.   
The 2009 Coup and Its Aftermath 
 On June 28, 2009, democratically elected President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales 
was removed from office in a military coup authorized by the Supreme Court of 
Honduras.2  In the preceding years, Zelaya had angered his opponents by instituting a 
number of socially progressive reforms, including doubling the minimum wage, issuing a 
moratorium on concessions for resource extraction, and expanding social programs, 
among many others, and he had made real progress toward resolving land conflicts in the 
Aguán and elsewhere.  In 2008, Honduras joined ALBA (the Bolivarian Alternative for 
the Americas, or Alternativa Bolivariana para Nuestra América), the alternative trade 
organization led by Venezuela, and Zelaya’s increasingly close relationships with leftist 
leaders throughout the region no doubt worried the elite and conservative sectors of the 
government.  A university student interviewed soon after the coup, citing Zelaya’s many 
social programs, observed, "That's why the elite classes can't stand him and why we want 
him back" (Dangl 2009).   Similarly, Tanya Kerssen argues that the coup “can be read as 
the expression of a class process set into motion by neoliberal restructuring” (2013, 5).   
                                                 
2 The involvement of the U.S. government in this coup, as in Honduran politics in general, is a hugely 
important topic into which I do not delve deeply here due to limitations of space.  Others have covered this 
extensively, including Frank (2011, 2012a, and 2012b) and Weisbrot (2009). 
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 Those who carried out the coup justified it on the grounds of Zelaya’s supposed 
transgression of presidential authority.  Zelaya had proposed to include a non-binding 
referendum in the November 2009 elections that would gauge electoral support for a 
Constitutional Convention, despite the Court’s opposition.  Zelaya’s opponents viewed 
this as an attempt to change the one term presidential limit dictated by the current 
Constitution, which was drafted in 1982 under a military dictatorship, and thus as a 
means to preserve his political power.  The fact that Zelaya would have been out of office 
long before the proposed convention would have convened (his term was to end in 
January, 2010) was somehow omitted from this reasoning.  As Mark Weisbrot so 
accurately describes, “The battle between Zelaya and his opponents pits a reform 
president who is supported by labour unions and social organisations against a mafia-like, 
drug-ridden, corrupt political elite who is accustomed to choosing not only the supreme 
court and the Congress, but also the president” (2009).   
 The consequences of the coup have been severe.3  As mentioned, the national 
homicide rate increased dramatically in the years following the coup.  Many of Zelaya’s 
progressive reforms have been dismantled and reversed by the subsequent regimes led by 
Roberto Micheletti, Porfirio Lobo, and Juan Orlando Hernandez.  A November 2013 
Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) report identifies Honduras as the most 
socially unequal nation in all of Latin America (Johnson and Lefebvre 2013, 9).   As the 
authors observe, Honduras “is one of just three countries [in Latin America] that have 
                                                 
3 Others have documented the post-coup environment extensively.  See, for example, Comisión de Verdad 
(2012), Johnston and Lefebvre (2013), IAHCR (2009), and Kerssen (2013).  
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seen its Gini coefficient4 increase since 2009.  Of those three, Honduras has seen the 
largest increase, amounting to 12.3 percent in just two years (9).”  What is more, they 
note that, “Prior to 2009, Honduras had experienced four consecutive years of decreasing 
inequality” – four years that coincided with the Zelaya administration (10).   Poverty 
rates reflect a similar trend.  Between 2006 and 2009 (the years of Zelaya’s presidency), 
poverty rates fell 7.7%, and extreme poverty rates fell a whopping 20.9% (Johnson and 
Lefebvre 2013, 10).  These rates then began to rise following the coup, and between 2010 
and 2013 they increased 13.2% and 26.3% respectively, leaving them higher than before 
Zelaya took office (Johnson and Lefebvre 2013, 10). 
 There has also been a massive resurgence of political repression, militarization, 
and confirmed death squad activity5 in Honduras.  Many national and international 
bodies, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the 
United Nations have denounced the frightening levels of political violence in the country.  
In a February 2014 letter to the UN Human Rights Council, Amnesty International 
expressed that they are “increasingly concerned about the human rights situation in 
Honduras, in particular about human rights violations against human rights defenders, 
women and girls, Indigenous, Afro-descendant and campesino (peasant) communities, 
and LGBTI people” (Amnesty International 2014).  These concerns have been echoed by 
many over the last five years. 
 At least 32 journalists have been assassinated since the coup, and as Owens notes, 
“many more continue to work in a climate of fear and self-censorship” (2014, 6).   The 
                                                 
4 A measure to assess equality of income distribution in a given country. 
 
5 See Bird (2013). 
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Reporters Without Borders World 2014 Press Freedom Index ranks Honduras number 
129 out of 180 countries, demonstrating the highly repressive environment journalists 
face.  In addition, at least 70 lawyers have been assassinated during this period (Front 
Line Defenders 2014), and a great deal of violence has been directed towards activists 
and community leaders across the country, including many high profile individuals and 
leaders of various organizations.  Activists defending land and natural resources are at 
particular risk, as evidenced by Global Witness’s 2014 report titled Deadly Environment.  
This report cites Honduras as the second most deadly country in the world for defenders 
of land and the environment, as they report 109 such killings between 2002 and 2013.6  
The authors note that this figure is actually likely significantly higher, in part because a 
“lack of public information around these threats and security implications for those in 
danger make it very difficult to track and systematize this data,” and thus their figures 
represent only the cases they could verify (Global Witness 2014, 4).  It is important to 
note that only 9 of these deaths occurred between 2002 and 2009, and the remaining 100 
in the post-coup years of 2010 to 2013. 
  The high levels of political repression and violence are complemented and 
exacerbated by widespread impunity.  A 2014 Human Rights Watch report quotes the 
former Attorney General as admitting that fully 80% of homicides in the nation are not 
prosecuted because “investigative organs don’t have the capacity to respond” (2).  Since 
most crimes are not investigated, the more generalized social violence that plagues 
Honduras provides a convenient cover for many perpetrators of political violence, as 
                                                 
6 The country with the most killings reported is Brazil, with a staggering 448.  However, when considering 
the differences in population between Honduras (roughly 8 million) and Brazil (nearly 200 million), the 
severity of the problem in Honduras becomes evident.  The country with the third highest number of 
killings is the Philippines, with 67 (2014, 6).  The population of the Philippines is roughly 100 million. 
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politically-motivated crimes are often never officially recognized as such.  Even when the 
motivations of these crimes are obvious, the intellectual authors and perpetrators of these 
crimes are almost never punished. 
 One positive consequence of the coup is the emergence of the FNRP, the Frente 
Nacional de Resistencia Popular or Popular Front of National Resistance.  This broad-
based coalition has united a wide range of social movements and sectors of Honduran 
society, including indigenous movements, campesinos, rural and urban labor unions, 
Garifuna communities, human rights organizations, LGBTI activists, teachers, students, 
and artists, among others.  Hondurans often refer to the coup as an “awakening” that 
forced the people to reflect on their collective state and spurred them to rise up in 
collective struggle for a more just society. 
Conditions in the Aguán 
 The contemporary situation in the Aguán is in many ways a microcosm of the 
political and social crisis facing Honduras as a whole.  The same issues of social 
inequality, insecurity, and injustice plague the region, as do high levels of political 
violence.  A 2011 International Fact Finding Mission comprised of several human rights 
and social justice organizations identifies the Aguán as “one of the regions most affected 
by tension and repression,” as “Peasant movements in this area, who fight for access to 
land in order to exercise their right to feed themselves, are faced with a situation of 
permanent harassment and abuse by public security forces, as well as members of private 
security companies” (FIDH et al. 2011, 6). 
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 The levels of repression in the Aguán are indeed extreme, and the tension 
mentioned in the FIDH et al. report is palpable in the region.  As Tanya Kerssen 
describes, “the Aguán has been pummeled by repeated waves of state-sponsored violence 
including constant surveillance, death threats, capture orders, kidnappings, sexual 
violence, torture, and assassinations” (2013, 43).  The Aguán has been highly militarized 
since the coup, and military checkpoints, soldiers armed with high-caliber weapons, and 
members of special police forces are common sights throughout the region.   
 As the conflict is ongoing, it is somewhat difficult to present definitive statistics 
on the numbers of assassinations and other acts of violence mentioned above.  The most 
recent report documenting this political violence at the time of this writing was issued by 
the Permanent Human Rights Observatory of the Aguán (Observatorio Permanente de 
Derechos Humanos del Aguán) in February, 2014.  Focused on violent deaths in the 
region specifically, the report counted 123 violent deaths and 6 forced disappearances 
between 2008 and 2013, with 110 of the deaths and all 6 disappearances occurring 
between 2010 and 2013 (Observatorio 2014, 5).  According to the report, 91 of the 129 
assassinated and forcefully disappeared were campesino men and women, 14 were 
private security guards, 7 landowners, 1 member each of the police and military, and the 
remaining 15 were either lawyers or “collateral or indirect victims” (6).   The report 
further recognizes that a massive rise in violence and deaths coincided with intensified 
militarization of the region in the summer of 2011, when the Operation Xatruch was 
installed in the Aguán (6).  The human rights group PROAH (Honduran Accompaniment 
Project, or Proyecto de Acompañamiento en Honduras) places the number of murders in 
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the Aguán through February 2014 at 147, noting that the victims were primarily 
“campesinos and human rights defenders” (2014, 10). 
 The campesino movement organizations have unquestionably suffered the 
greatest losses of life in this conflict.  The Permanent Observatory report documents that 
of the individuals assassinated, 49 belonged to the movement organization MUCA, 11 to 
MCA, 9 to MARCA, 8 to MOCRA, 4 to MCRNA, 3 to Movimiento Campesino de 
Rigores, and 1 each to the Empresa Asociativa Gregorio Chávez and the Movimiento 
Campesino Salado Lis Lis, while 4 did not belong to a particular organization (2014, 9).  
These organizations are among the roughly 20 that currently operate in the Aguán, and 
are all decidedly nonviolent movements focused on regaining their land and achieving 
food sovereignty and social justice. 
 The nearly absolute impunity with which these crimes and human rights abuses 
are perpetrated is astounding.  The title of the previously cited 2014 Human Rights 
Watch report – “There are no Investigations Here” (“Aqui no hay investigaciones”) – 
originates from the following interaction: 
 When asked by Human Rights Watch about the status of investigations into 
 killings and the general lack of accountability for such crimes in Bajo Aguán, 
 Germán Alfaro Escalante – commander of military unit Fuerza Xatruch III 
 deployed to the region to aid police in fighting crime and resolving the land 
 conflict – said, “There are no investigations here.” (HRW 2014, 27) 
I find Coronel Alfaro Escalante’s comment to be very illustrative of the dynamics of the 
conflict, and of the reasons why it continues.   His words reflect the state’s complicity 
and overall lack of interest in pursuing justice in the region, either in terms of working to 
find a solution to the land disputes or of punishing those responsible for acts of violence.  
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The political violence against campesino movements in the Aguán is simply not a matter 
deemed worthy of investigation. 
 The struggle in the Aguán is in part the result of it being one of the most fertile 
and productive agricultural regions in the country, as well as the former “Capital of 
Agrarian Reform” (Macías 2001).  On the perimeter of the primary banana-growing 
region in Honduras, the Aguán is now dominated by huge plantations of African palm 
trees.  Introduced to the region on a fairly small-scale several decades ago, African palm 
cultivation has greatly increased in recent years – from covering 48,000 hectares in 1981 
to 120,000 in 20097 (Irías n.d., 16).  The climate in the Aguán is ideal for cultivation of 
the palm, which is grown for the oil contained in its fruit.   That oil is then used primarily 
as cooking oil, in processed foods, as biofuel, and in cosmetics and a handful of other 
consumer products.  Unfortunately, this expansion has come at the expense of the 
cultivation of food crops, and ultimately at the expense of peace and safety in the 
communities of the Aguán. 
 The three largest landowners in the Aguán are agro-businessmen Miguel Facussé 
Barjum, René Morales, and Reinaldo Canales.  Together, they are in possession of some 
75% of the land in this region, as I describe in the following chapter.  Facussé, the richest 
and arguably most powerful man in Honduras, is the executive president of the Dinant 
Corporation (Corporación Dinant), which processes palm oil for use in biofuels and 
snack foods.  Through Dinant, Facussé holds more than 22,000 hectares in the Aguán 
Valley – roughly one fifth of the total land (Frank 2011).  Facussé wields tremendous 
                                                 
7 1 hectare is equal to approximately 2.5 acres; thus 120,000 hectares is equal to just under 300,000 acres. 
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economic and political power in Honduras, and has many business interests in addition to 
Dinant.  He is also commonly recognized as a major narcotrafficker8 and was a primary 
supporter of the 2009 coup.  His nephew Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé was the 
President of Honduras from 1998 to 2002 and now owns La Tribuna, one of the country’s 
main newspapers, and many of his other family members are powerful players in 
business and government.   
 Facussé’s private security forces have been widely accused of perpetrating much 
of the violence in the Aguán, and he has admitted to their involvement in certain 
killings.9   Facussé’s crimes received global attention in early 2014, due to concerns 
raised in an internal audit of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World 
Bank’s international lending arm, regarding a $30 million loan made to Corporación 
Dinant.  In their investigation, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) 
demonstrated that the IFC had failed to properly investigate the many allegations of 
violence made against Facussé and the repressive context in which these loans were 
being utilized.  The World Bank is subsequently investigating the situation to determine 
whether they will go through with the second $15 million disbursement of the $30 
million loan in light of these revelations.10  Activists in Honduras and their allies have 
been pressuring the World Bank for several years to cease their funding to Dinant. 
                                                 
8 Evidence revealed in cables published by Wikileaks confirmed that the U.S. State Department has long 
been aware of Facussé’s narcotrafficking activities, as noted by Dana Frank (2011). 
 
9 For more on this, see Beeton (2012), and Frank (2012a). 
 
10 For more, see CAO (n.d.), Woodsome (2014), and Vidal (2014). 
17 
 
 I will discuss the nature of this conflict, the contemporary situation in the Aguán, 
and the grassroots response to it in much greater detail in subsequent chapters.  I turn 
now to an explanation of the research methods I utilized to address my research questions 
and to craft the analysis that follows, and then conclude this chapter with a brief preview 
of the chapters ahead. 
Methodology 
 In many ways, the research for this project began on June 28, 2009.  I was living 
in San Salvador, El Salvador, when I awoke to the news of the coup in neighboring 
Honduras.  As I followed the news that day, I realized how little I knew about the history, 
cultures, and political and social movements of Honduras, despite having spent several 
years studying these same things throughout Latin America.  I had very little context 
through which to comprehend what was happening in Tegucigalpa and elsewhere that 
day.  From that time, I began to follow developments in Honduras quite closely, and later 
decided to focus my graduate work on the contemporary situation there.  
 The primary sources of data for this project include documents published by 
movement organizations and their allies, videos of interviews and public statements made 
by activists, websites of movement organizations, and my observations made during 
more than six months spent in Honduras over the course of two and a half years.  I 
gleaned a great deal of information through participant-observation, as I was present for 
many important events, including public demonstrations, press conferences, and the 2013 
national elections.  I witnessed state violence against campesino activists and the extreme 
militarization of the Aguán.  During my time in Honduras, I also collected a number of 
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books, reports, news stories, documentary films, and other materials from a wide variety 
of sources that shed light on the conflict.  Below, I outline each of these methods in turn. 
Document Collection 
 Among the most important data sources to my study are written public statements 
(often called comunicados or communiqués) issued by movement organizations.  These 
statements represent the stance of movement organizations on a given issue or issues, and 
are published on websites, read at public events, sent to media outlets, or distributed in 
other forums.  They often include calls to action, movements’ demands of the state, 
and/or appeals to the international community for support.  These statements are 
important to my research as they clearly and concisely represent the collective voice of a 
movement, its analysis of a given situation, and in many cases, its proposals for 
resolution.  Comunicados are issued irregularly when the need arises – often in direct 
response to acts of violence or repression – and are often issued jointly by several 
movement organizations and their allies.  I have gathered a total of 16 comunicados from 
the campesino movements, Plataforma Agraria, the FNRP, MUCA and other allies.  I 
primarily selected documents based on their availability online and the relevance of their 
subject matter to my research. In addition to these comunicados, I gathered many other 
documents published by movement organizations.  These include reports on the state of 
the Aguán, including those documenting political violence and human rights abuses, 
analyses of La Ley de Modernización and proposals for a new agrarian reform law, and 
case studies of individual movement organizations. 
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 I have also collected seven videos of various lengths and forms.  Among these 
videos are interviews with and public statements made by movement leaders, which are 
often posted on movement organizations’ websites or made available via websites such as 
YouTube or Vimeo.  These provide important pieces of primary data, as they again 
represent the collective voice of the campesino movements (via their spokespeople) and 
their analyses of the conflict in the Aguán.  Additionally, I viewed several videos 
produced by news outlets such as Alba tv, Al Jazeera and the Real News Network, which 
all include statements by the same movement leaders and participants.  These public 
declarations are essential to my research, as they express the collective voice of 
movements in a way that interviews with individuals often cannot.   
 Finally, I analyzed the content of movement organizations' websites.  In addition 
to the specific content of the videos and documents that are often available here, there is 
much to be learned from the websites themselves.  Movement organizations often use 
these spaces to articulate their struggle to the wider public, and to document their history, 
the acts of violence they experience, and their vision for the future.  These sites are 
among the primary venues through which the movements can reach the international 
community, and as such are very relevant to my analysis of the ways in which the 
movements frame their struggles for land and social justice.  
Participant-Observation 
 I spent the summers of 2011 and 2012 in Honduras, and an additional ten days in 
November, 2013.  In 2011, I served as a human rights observer in Zacate Grande, a 
peninsula on the southern coast of Honduras where residents are engaged in a struggle for 
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their land against Miguel Facussé.  During this time, I learned a great deal about the 
dynamics of land tenure and struggles for social justice in Honduras.  That summer also 
marked the beginning of my relationship with COFADEH,11 as they operate the human 
rights observatory in Zacate Grande in conjunction with CICA, an Italian NGO. 
 I returned to Honduras for the summer of 2012 to complete fieldwork while 
working as an intern in the COFADEH office in Tegucigalpa.  Over the course of seven 
weeks, I spent between forty and sixty hours weekly in the COFADEH office and on 
work-related trips.   During that time, I was constantly immersed in the activities of social 
and political movements.  I attended an important press conference held at the 
Tegucigalpa office of La Vía Campesina, during which leaders from the FNRP and 
MUCA denounced the increased militarization of and political violence in the Aguán, 
and reiterated the movements’ position on both the causes of and potential solutions to 
the conflict.  I had countless conversations with activists from diverse movements and 
parts of the country.  I was surrounded by journalists and human rights defenders who 
have a deep understanding of the political landscape of Honduras, including the conflict 
in the Aguán, and who visit the region regularly.   
 In early August, I accompanied a colleague from COFADEH on a three-day trip 
to the Aguán.  During that trip, we visited the community of Guadalupe Carney, which is 
affiliated with the campesino organization MCA and has been engaged in a bloody 
                                                 
11 COFADEH, the Committee of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (Comité de 
Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduaras), is among the most well-known and esteemed 
human rights organizations in Central America.  Since its formation in 1982, the members of this 
organization have worked fearlessly to document political violence and human rights abuses, provide 
training and legal defense to activists and communities, and advocate for social and political change in 
Honduras, among many other things.  It is in many ways a center of activity for social movements in 
Honduras today.  For more, see www.cofadeh.hn. 
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struggle for its land for more than a decade.  My colleague interviewed several 
community leaders there, and while those testimonies are not directly cited in my 
research, they provided important information regarding the dynamics of their struggles 
and helped me comprehend the complexity of the movements in the Aguán and the 
degree to which their experiences vary at times.  While in the Aguán, we also met with 
individuals from Fundación Popol Nah Tun, a local NGO that works with the campesino 
collectives on development and food security issues. 
 I had originally planned to spend two weeks in the Aguán following my work 
with COFADEH, and to conduct interviews with movement actors there.  After this trip, 
however, it became very clear to me that this would not be possible.  In the days 
preceding our trip, the violence in the area had escalated considerably.  It was also 
brought to my attention that the military was closely monitoring all foreigners in the 
region.  During such a critical and violent moment in this struggle, ethical considerations 
prevented me from injecting myself into this situation and asking people to give their 
time for my research.  It was at this time I chose to focus on movement-produced 
materials as my primary sources of data in lieu of personal interviews, as I feel these 
materials more accurately represent a collective voice of the movements.  I am confident 
that my research is based on a rich collection of data despite this limitation, and is 
perhaps the better for it. 
 In November, 2013, I returned to Honduras as part of the leadership team for an 
elections monitoring delegation organized by the Alliance for Global Justice and the 
Marin Task Force on the Americas.  Our group spent the first week of this trip visiting 
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communities and social movement organizations in the northern part of the country, in 
order to document the context in which the November 24th national and local elections 
were taking place.  During this time, we met with leaders of the CNTC and SITRAINBA, 
organizations representing campesinos and banana workers, respectively, among many 
other groups.  We were also credentialed international observers for the elections, and our 
teams monitored polling places in five departments (states) on election day.  These 
experiences further deepened my understanding of the contemporary situation in 
Honduras. 
Data Analysis 
 I employ multiple means of data analysis to address my research questions in this 
project.  In order to identify the policy implications of La Ley de Modernización 
(LMDSA), I follow best practices of policy analysis, while also recognizing the 
limitations of this approach and seeking to problematize it.  While I do not undertake 
quantitative research, I utilize my qualitative research to describe the effects this 
particular policy has had on the populace of the Aguán.  I also consider potential policy 
solutions to the current conflict, and engage a political economic analysis to identify the 
ways in which a market-based policy solution may not be appropriate for the problem of 
landlessness in the Aguán. 
 I engaged in content analysis using the primary documents I have collected, 
including comunicados, videotaped interviews, and other movement-produced materials.  
I coded these documents (including transcriptions of videos) using an open coding 
technique.  I began by identifying key words, themes, and concepts, and used these to 
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build my analysis, seeking to triangulate across sources whenever possible.  Both 
manifest and latent content in the data are relevant to my study, and I thus used both 
strategies, as discussed by Berg (2007), to interrogate my data. 
Limitations of Study 
 This study is inherently limited in scope for a number of reasons.  First, the highly 
volatile context is among the most relevant limitations for this project.  As mentioned, 
safety and other logistical concerns prevented me from spending an extended period of 
time in the Aguán.  Also, my own limitations of time and resources are relevant here, as 
one could spend many years attempting to fully comprehend the complex dimensions of 
the conflict in the Aguán.  The roughly twenty campesino movement organizations all 
have unique experiences with the agrarian reform and counter-reform processes, and 
currently face varying degrees of political violence.  There is no singular and definitive 
stance across movement organizations on many issues in the Aguán, and as such, my 
project cannot possibly reflect all the nuances of this tremendously complicated situation. 
 Additional limitations include my language abilities and cultural background.  
While I read, write, and speak Spanish with a high level of proficiency, it is not my 
mother tongue.  As the majority of my data is in Spanish, as well as virtually all the 
communications and interactions I had during my time in Honduras, the opportunity for 
miscommunication is one of which I must be conscious.  Finally, cultural barriers are 
unavoidable in this or any other intercultural research.  Regardless of the amount of time 
I spend in Honduras and the degree to which I am dedicated to this struggle, I will always 
be an outsider and must always consider this in my analysis. 
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Thesis Structure 
 This thesis consists of five chapters.  Following this introduction, Chapter II 
offers a review of the literature most relevant to this project and provides a theoretical 
framework that I argue helps us best understand my case study.  Chapter III is dedicated 
to an analysis of La Ley de Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola (LMDSA), 
the policy that is central to both this project and, I argue, the ongoing conflict in the 
Aguán.  Chapter IV examines the campesino movements in the Aguán.  In that chapter, I 
offer an analysis of these movements that seeks to integrate culturalist, structuralist, and 
materialist concerns, and is informed by Doug McAdam’s revised political process model 
(1999).  Here, I examine the public discourse of the movements in order to more fully 
understand the nature of the movements and the ways in which they shape and are shaped 
by the context in which they operate.   Chapter V offers concluding thoughts and policy 
recommendations regarding this situation. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
 This thesis seeks to explore the interconnectedness of neoliberal economic policy, 
political violence, and popular resistance in the Aguán Valley of Honduras, and to 
examine the ways in which campesino movements are framing their struggles and 
asserting themselves as legitimate actors in the policy realm.  In order to understand the 
dynamics of these phenomena in this particular context, we must first explore the nature 
of each in turn.  In doing so, I aim to make the relationships between these seemingly 
discrete topics evident. 
 The impacts of neoliberal policies have been significant in Honduras, as 
elsewhere in Latin America.  These policies were systematically implemented throughout 
the region at the behest of international financial institutions (IFIs) in the form of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which drastically altered national economic, 
political, and social landscapes.   In the Aguán, the most direct effect of structural 
adjustment was the reversal of previous agrarian reform and the subsequent 
commodification of land via the Ley de Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola 
(Law of Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector, or LMDSA), which 
I examine at length in Chapter III.  This led not only to increased landlessness and rural 
poverty in the region, but also to the militarization of the Aguán and the use of state-
sponsored and state-sanctioned violence to enforce elite property rights.  The social 
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movements that have emerged to contest these realities employ a range of strategies and 
tactics, and in doing so both shape and are shaped by the ongoing conflict. 
 In this chapter, I begin with a brief discussion of the basic tenets of neoliberal 
economic policies and SAPs.  I then examine neoliberalism as a political project, 
exploring the ways in which this doctrine serves to entrench the social and political 
power of elites and to exacerbate social inequality.  Next, I move to the issue of agrarian 
reform, considering the nature of land in the neoliberal era and the competing models of 
state-led vs. market-led agrarian reform.  The final sections of this chapter focus on 
political violence and social movements, and the nature of these in the neoliberal context.  
My intention is not to provide an exhaustive review of the literature in any of these areas, 
but rather to build a theoretical framework through which to best interpret and understand 
the current conflict in the Aguán. 
Neoliberal Policy and Structural Adjustment 
 As James Ferguson (2009) has noted, the term “neoliberalism” is widely used and 
carries a number of meanings.12  He argues that we can distinguish between neoliberalism 
                                                 
12 It is important here to note that I fully understand the degree to which this discussion of neoliberalism is 
limited and, in many ways, superficial.  I use the term “neoliberalism” in reference to the discourse and 
policy orientation that has driven the global capitalist system in recent decades, largely by way of U.S. 
imperial control over foreign economies and IFIs.  While certainly important and relevant, a deeper 
analysis and critique of that system is ultimately beyond the scope of this project.  As neoliberalism 
remains an important concept in my fields, I will utilize that term, its limitations notwithstanding.  Here I 
find Hart- Landsberg’s (2006) assessment instructive: “While the term ‘neoliberalism’ does, in many ways, 
capture the essence of contemporary capitalist practices and policies, it is also in some important respects a 
problematic term. In particular, it encourages the view that a wide range of policy options simultaneously 
exist under capitalism, with neoliberalism just one of the possibilities. States could reject neoliberalism, if 
they wanted, and implement more social democratic or interventionist policies, similar to those employed 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, things are not so simple. The ‘freeing’ of economic activity that is 
generally identified with neoliberalism is not so much a bad policy choice as it is a forced structural 
response on the part of many third world states to capitalist generated tensions and contradictions. Said 
differently, it is capitalism (as a dynamic and exploitative system), rather than neoliberalism (as a set of 
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as a “macroeconomic doctrine” that promotes the ideals of the free market and holds 
particular views regarding the appropriate role of the state, and neoliberalism as the 
“regime of policies and practices associated with or claiming fealty to the doctrine” 
(170).  These policies can be employed to meet certain political ends that may or may not 
relate to the economic doctrine of neoliberalism, leading David Harvey (2005) to 
distinguish further between the economic theory and practices of neoliberalism and its 
“political project.”  I return to the political project of neoliberalism – which is particularly 
relevant in the Honduran case – later in this chapter, after first establishing the general 
orientation of the macroeconomic doctrine, and examining how the ideals it promotes 
manifest in specific policies and structural adjustment programs. 
 The principal features of the neoliberal doctrine have been extensively 
documented and are by now familiar to social scientists and economists alike.13  At the 
most basic level, these include an almost religious belief in the ideals of the free market – 
often termed “free market fetishism” – and a complementary desire to minimize the role 
of the state in the economic realm.  The neoliberal state thus focuses on maintaining a 
climate that privileges “strong individual property rights, the rule of law, and the 
institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade” (Harvey 2005, 64) through a 
host of standard policy prescriptions.   
 The doctrine also claims that social problems can be solved by the market.  For 
Harvey, neoliberalism “holds that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
policies), that must be challenged and overcome” (n.p.).  While I wholeheartedly agree that the nature of 
the capitalist system itself underlies the problems at hand in this case, I will focus my critique on the 
neoliberal orientation that has dominated the system in recent decades. 
 
13 For more details, see Harvey (2005, 2007); Panizza (2009); Wallerstein (2008). 
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reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the 
domain of the market” (2005, 3).  Taitu Heron (2008) describes neoliberalism as “a 
theory which endorses the market as the mover and shaker of the economy and the key 
instrument through which social problems can now be solved” (89).  Robert W. 
McChesney (2001) describes it as “the set of national and international policies that call 
for business domination of all social affairs with minimal countervailing force” (n.p.).  In 
the realm of neoliberal economics, then, it becomes reasonable to address issues such as 
poverty, landlessness, and social inequality via market-based solutions. 
 The neoliberal doctrine gained increasing sway in global political economic 
discourse in the mid 1970s, largely due to the dominance of U.S. economists and 
policymakers in the realm (Klein 2007; Harvey 2007).  This dominance is captured in the 
term “Washington Consensus,” which was coined by British economist John Williams in 
1989, and is today commonly used to describe the neoliberal policy orientation dictated 
by IFIs around the globe (Williams 2004).  This orientation manifests in policies focused 
on: “stabilization (of prices and national accounts), privatization (of the means of 
production…state enterprises), liberalization (of trade and capital flows), deregulation (of 
private activity), and fiscal austerity” (Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997, 22).  It is 
widely accepted that this approach had become hegemonic by the 1990s (see Harvey 
2005, 2007; Heron 2008; Chomsky 1999), and McChesney calls it “the defining political 
economic paradigm of our time” (1998, 7).  The proliferation of structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) imposed on scores of nations in the Global South, primarily during the 
final decades of the twentieth century, demonstrates the validity of these claims. 
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 These SAPs included a relatively standard set of reforms adhering to the approach 
outlined above.  Many national governments adopted the reforms as conditions attached 
to loans from the World Bank and IMF, which were granted in large part to aid nations in 
their repayment of external debts14 (Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997, 16).  The IFIs 
also presented these reforms as essential to the notion of “development.”  As an 
embodiment of the neoliberal doctrine, these policies followed the logic that economic 
growth would produce wealth that would then “trickle down” to benefit the average 
citizen.  For Dumenil and Levy (2004), however, neoliberalism was never truly intended 
as “a new model of development,” but instead “must be seen as a new social order whose 
purpose was the restoration of the income and wealth of the upper fraction of ruling 
classes, the owners of the means of production” (1).  As Huron aptly describes, this 
approach “promotes a ‘development strategy’ that emphasizes efficiency, growth, and 
competitiveness over social justice and redistribution” (1998, 89).  Further, he notes the 
assumption of universalism contained in this approach, where it is expected “that the 
application of these policies will amount to economic success,” and that “implementation 
of privatization, liberalization and deregulation will always guarantee very specific 
results regardless of the social and cultural contexts within which they may be subjected 
to” (1998, 95).  The results of these SAPs, however, have been far from universally 
positive, as we will soon see in the case of Honduras.    
                                                 
14 For more on the manufactured “debt crisis” and its role in consolidating the dominance of the 
Washington Consensus’ neoliberal approach, see Klein (2007); Chomsky (1999); and Kolko (1988). 
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Neoliberalism as a Political Project 
 Scholars have increasingly drawn attention to the importance of neoliberalism as 
a political project (e.g. Harvey 2005, 2007; McChesney 1998; Bourdieu 1998).   David 
Harvey poses a very salient question: “In whose particular interests is it that the state take 
a neoliberal stance and in what ways have those interests used neoliberalism to benefit 
themselves rather than, as is claimed, everyone, everywhere?” (2007, 24).  He argues that 
the “crisis of capital accumulation of the 1970s” led to a rise in popular movements that 
proposed socialist alternatives to the capitalist status quo, thus threatening “ruling classes 
everywhere” in both economic and political terms (2007, 27-8).  Elsewhere, he makes the 
widely-cited assertion that we can view “neoliberalization either as a utopian project to 
realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a 
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the 
power of economic elites” (2005, 19, original emphasis).  Harvey’s final point is of 
particular importance, as local elites are nearly always allied with the global forces 
instituting these policies (Lilley 2011, 50-1).  Moyo and Yeros (2005) recognize that 
structural adjustment has disproportionately impacted peasant populations, arguing that 
the practice has “reinforced and deepened the postwar trend of incorporation of the 
peasantry into the sphere of commodity production at the same time as it has 
marginalized it” (18). 
 As Harvey notes, neoliberal discourse not only manifests in certain policies that 
privilege capital accumulation, but also results in “important structural changes in the 
nature of governance,” as within this approach “a way has to be found to integrate state 
decision-making into the dynamics of capital accumulation and the networks of class 
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power” that are being formed or restored in a given place (2005, 76).  As such, we see 
increased corporate influence in the legal and policy realms, states that acquiesce to the 
needs and desires of capital, and many cases where corporations “acquire a strong role in 
writing legislation, determining public policies, and setting regulatory frameworks 
(which are mainly advantageous to themselves)” (Harvey 2005, 76-7).  What follows 
from this is that, at a time when the role of government is theoretically limited, the 
“coercive arm of the state” is regularly mobilized “to protect corporate interests and, if 
necessary, to repress dissent” (Harvey 2005, 77).  I will explore this important function of 
the neoliberal state further in the subsequent section on political violence. 
 It is very apparent, then, that in an analysis of neoliberalism and the policies it 
inspires, we must always consider the power dynamics at play at both local and global 
levels.  The neoliberal context privileges both the economic and political interests of 
elites as it creates conditions favorable to capital accumulation and allows rather direct 
elite and corporate control over public policy and law.  The consequences of this reality 
for society at large are not, however, benign.  Many scholars explore the impacts and 
outcomes of neoliberal policies on the non-elite sectors of society.  McChesney (1998) 
describes these outcomes as such: 
 The economic consequences of these policies have been the same just about 
 everywhere, and exactly what one would expect:  a massive increase in social and 
 economic inequality, a marked increase in severe deprivation for the poorest 
 nations and peoples of the world, a disastrous global environment, an unstable 
 global economy and an unprecedented bonanza for the wealthy. (8) 
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Similarly, for Heron (1998):  
 What has occurred has been the exacerbation of existing structures of inequality, 
 thereby linking neoliberal policies to new forms of social exclusion.  The 
 neoliberal policy package draws its social power from the political and economic 
 power of those whose interests it expresses: stockholders, financial operators, 
 industrialists, conservative politicians and high-level financial officials. (91)   
 
 David Harvey thus concludes that “The main substantive achievement of 
neoliberalization…has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, wealth and income” 
(2005, 159).  This redistribution, however, has occurred in an upward direction, as 
neoliberalism served “to transfer assets and channel wealth and income either from the 
mass of the population toward the upper classes or from vulnerable to rich countries” via 
a process of “accumulation by dispossession” (2007, 34).  As an extension of the process 
of “primitive” or “original” accumulation identified by Marx,15 Harvey identifies several 
avenues through which this contemporary process of accumulation operates, including, 
among others: 
  (1) the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of 
 peasant populations…; (2) conversion of various forms of property rights 
 (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusively private property rights; (3) 
 suppression of rights to the commons; (4) commodification of labor power and 
 the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and 
 consumption; (5) colonial, neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of 
 assets (including natural resources)... (2007, 34-5) 
 
 Fred Magdoff similarly recognizes this process in a recent article titled “Twenty-
First-Century Land Grabs:  Accumulation by Agricultural Dispossession” (2013).  He 
                                                 
15 See Marx’s Capital. 
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notes that while accumulation by dispossession has been a central process throughout the 
history of capitalism,16 the specific nature of the process has evolved based on the 
circumstances of a given historic era.   He thus identifies, among others, the recent 
processes of “economic dispossession” and “accumulation by rural dispossession.”  The 
former occurred by way of the imposition of neoliberal trade agreements globally, which 
were “a part of capital’s push to open up the nations of the South to easier exploitation” 
(6).  These agreements manifested in policies that subjected Southern markets to 
increased international competition while simultaneously removing local protections, 
leading to disastrous results for small-scale producers throughout the South (6-7).   
 “Accumulation by rural dispossession” has followed in the wake of these trade 
agreements, where the neoliberal policies they spawn combine with increased 
financialization, rising food prices, greater demand for biofuels in the North (thus 
displacing food crops), and environmental degradation, as well as “insecure peasant land 
tenure in many countries and widespread corruption” (7).  The result of this convergence 
is massive land grabbing throughout the Global South, and thus concentration of land in 
the hands of elites and corporations (7).  While these trends often lead to dispossession 
due to inability to compete on economic terms, Magdoff argues that in the contemporary 
era “‘extra-economic means’ have also been prominent – new laws passed that abrogate 
customary rights or promote investment; the barrel of a gun; and corruption of local, 
regional, and national officials” (16).  He concludes that these factors all combine in such 
                                                 
16 Magdoff writes:  “The commodification of land – that most basic of resources, the source of terrestrial 
life, and the foundation of human civilization – was essential for the development of capitalism.  And from 
the early modern capitalist era until the present, it is the commodification of nature…that is the underlying 
basis of the dispossession of people from their lands” (2013, 1-2). 
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a way as to warrant the recognition of “a qualitatively new, historically specific 
transformation” (16).   
 Magdoff’s analysis could not more perfectly describe the contemporary situation 
in the Aguán Valley of Honduras, where the process of accumulation by rural 
dispossession has been largely facilitated, I argue, by the LMDSA.  The concentration of 
land in elite and corporate hands and the widespread landlessness that results among the 
peasantry is at the center of the current conflict.  The “extra-economic means” identified 
by Magdoff are particularly relevant in this case, and combine with the other factors he 
cites to create a very troubling situation. 
Land in the Neoliberal Context 
 The literature that addresses the importance of land – in terms of access to it, the 
relationships between this access and rural poverty, and the history of and possibilities for 
future land reform, among other topics – is vast, indeed.  For our purposes, it is important 
to briefly review these issues in relation to the neoliberal context.  Like the preceding 
discussion of political and economic power dynamics, understanding the particular 
characteristics of land and agrarian reform under neoliberalism is central to my analysis 
of recent policy (the LMDSA) and the conflict in the Aguán. 
 The highly unequal distribution of land and widespread rural poverty that plague 
most of contemporary Latin America are not new phenomena.  Henry Veltmeyer (2005) 
argues that the fact that a majority of rural households there live below the officially 
recognized poverty line (and most of these below the “extreme poverty” line) is both the 
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result of recent neoliberal policies and “entrenched” land tenure and ownership policies 
that long predate neoliberalism (291-2).  Others similarly draw direct connections 
between a lack of access to land and poverty, including Zoomers and van der Haar (2000, 
17); de Janvry, Gordillo, Platteau, and Sadoulet (2001, 1); Brockett (1998); and Borras, 
Kay, and Akram-Lodhi (2007, 1).  In his classic text The Agrarian Question and 
Reformism in Latin America (1981), de Janvry charts the history of uneven development 
in land and agricultural holdings in detail, demonstrating the relevance of this to ongoing 
rural poverty in Latin America and beyond. 
 While it is clear that the lack of equitable access to land predated neoliberalism, 
the discourse has altered the ways in which land is understood and valued, leading to the 
exacerbation of historical inequalities.  Borras, Kay, and Akram-Lodhi (2007) recognize 
that “The neoliberal paradigm on land policies is the dominant current in today’s 
development policy discourse and practice” (18).  The prevailing view is that land is first 
and foremost a commodity, completely divorced from what Borras, Kay, and Akram-
Lodhi call its “social, cultural, and political dimensions” (2007, 21).  Issa G. Shivji 
recognizes this new phase of capitalist accumulation, while noting that like its 
predecessors, it “is rooted in the destruction of people and their livelihoods and the 
pillaging of resources:  land, forests, minerals, water, bioresources” (2011, 4). 
 This increased commodification of land is particularly evident when considering 
recent trends in agricultural policy.  Charles Brockett (1998) cites the dominance of 
export-focused agricultural policies as “the preferred model of economic development,” 
leading to massive changes in “traditional agricultural structures and practices” – a shift 
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he refers to as the “contemporary agrarian transformation” (3).  The effects of this 
transformation have been highly detrimental to the peasant population, he argues, and 
have only served to intensify inequality (4).  Similarly, Tiney discusses the “transnational 
agro-export model” and its effects in restructuring the countryside, as it “eradicates the 
possibilities for small-scale production to subsist, and it promotes the expulsion of 
peasants from the countryside, generating poverty in its wake” (2009, 81).   
 The nature of local struggles for land is now increasingly connected to the nature 
of the global political economy.  For Utsa Patnaik, “the classical land question” remains 
central today, particularly due to the proliferation of land grabbing in the South.  The 
contemporary agrarian crisis, she argues, “is the direct outcome of the implementation of 
the neoliberal reform policies and trade liberalisation…with the state facilitating land 
grabbing by the international and national corporates” (51)  She concludes, “Thus the 
land question has now become one of defending the right of peasants, including tribal 
peoples, to their land and livelihoods.  Not only can it never be separated from the fight 
against imperialist globalisation, this fight is a necessary condition for any advance on the 
land question” (51).     
 These observations lead us to consider the “agrarian question,” which has 
received renewed attention in the literature in recent years.  At its most basic level, the 
traditional agrarian question considered the effects of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism on the peasantry.17 For Courville and Patel, the question “pivoted on the role 
of the small-farm sector and the pace of capitalism’s movement into agriculture” (2006, 
                                                 
17 See Lenin (1964), de Janvry (1981), Kautsky (1988). 
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5), and as Moyo and Yeros frame it, at center are “the familiar historical questions over 
the socio-economic character and political significance of the peasantry under capitalism” 
(2005, 25).  Today, theorists have revived this debate concerning the nature of peasant 
populations in a new context:  the neoliberal era of global monopoly capitalism.  Moyo 
and Yeros examine the contemporary agrarian question at length, arguing that the “semi-
proletarianization” of the peasantry, a state that earlier theorists predicted would 
disappear,18 instead “persists as the dominant condition in the countrysides of the 
periphery” (2005, 19). They further note that, “So long as capital does not need to realise 
its profits nationally, semi-proletarianization and poverty are ‘functional’ to its 
reproduction” (20).  This “functional dualism”19 is the relationship that agrarian reform, 
at least in its transformational form, aims to disrupt (2005, 20).   
Competing Models of Agrarian Reform 
 Many states throughout the Global South have undertaken efforts to redistribute 
land to their citizens in a more equitable and/or efficient manner.  Often as efforts to 
address the colonial legacy of the concentration of land in the hands of elites and the 
modern state, these policies of agrarian reform have come in many forms and have 
                                                 
18 See Kautsky (1988) 
 
19 de Janvry (1981) examines functional dualism at length.  He notes that “Functional dualism between 
peasant and commercial sectors in Latin American agriculture implies the increasing proletarianization and 
impoverishment of the rural masses.  As the domination of capital over the peasantry increases, the struggle 
for survival induces not only a fierce competition for wages and product sales among peasants but also an 
intense search by peasants for additional productive resources (land and labor power) in order to increase 
the productivity of labor” (85).   
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enjoyed varied degrees of success.20 Agrarian reform initiatives over the last century are 
generally divided into two basic categories:  the first is alternately referred to as 
“populist” or “state-led agrarian reform” (SLAR), and the second as “neoliberal” or 
“market-led agrarian reform” (MLAR).  While SLAR was the dominant model through 
the first half of the twentieth century, previously mentioned shifts in the global political 
economy – and in development discourse, specifically – have led to the prominence of 
the neoliberal or market-led model of agrarian reform in recent decades. 
 The aims of SLAR or populist reforms are largely redistributive in nature, often 
rooted in rights-based discourses or the notion of “land to the tiller” (Zoomers 2000a, 60).  
In these types of reforms, land is often granted collectively to farming or production 
cooperatives, and the government generally retains some control over it, prohibiting the 
purchase or sale of reform sector lands on the market (see Zoomers and van der Haar 
2000; Rosset, Patel, and Courville 2006).  Equity of access to and ownership of land are 
central considerations, as these types of reforms tend to take seriously concerns of social 
justice, food sovereignty, and honoring peoples’ connection to the land (Wolford 2007). 
 The approach to agrarian reform has unquestionably changed with the transition 
to the neoliberal era.  While it is true that at an underlying level, as Zoomers notes, “the 
problem seems to be the same (unequal distribution of land and uncertainty over the right 
to cultivate land permanently), the context has changed considerably,” as have the 
approaches to addressing the problem (2000a, 59).  At the forefront of the conversation 
today, then, are concerns about land markets and property rights, and policies are “driven 
                                                 
20 For more on the history of agrarian reform, its theoretical orientation, and specific case studies, see 
Borras, Kay, and Akram-Lodhi (2007); Rosset, Patel, and Courville (2006); de Janvry (1981); de Janvry, 
Gordillo, Platteau, and Sadoulet (2001), and Zoomers and van der Haar (2000). 
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mainly by the quest for efficiency” (Zoomers 2000a, 60).  The orientation of agrarian 
reform efforts thus reflects a state where: 
 The establishment of private ownership of land and the development of a full-
 fledged market are considered key elements in achieving various policy goals, 
 such as stimulating agricultural development (national economic growth), poverty 
 reduction (redistribution of wealth), and safeguarding the environment 
 (sustainable production).  There is widespread belief that land privatization (i.e., 
 the granting of individual property titles) and abolishing the old restrictions are 
 important instruments for producing a more efficient – and more equitable – 
 distribution of the land, and creating a basis for sustainable land use.  (Zoomers 
 2000a, 59) 
 
Thus, many of the same goals and concerns are cited by advocates of both populist and 
neoliberal agrarian reforms, but the divergence lies in ideas about how to best attain these 
goals. 
  Wendy Wolford (2007) similarly characterizes the neoliberal trend in agrarian 
reform as one that aims to create efficient rural markets and increase production on the 
land, and that views the market as the best way to allocate land to meet these ends.  Thus, 
she argues that a primary difference between the models “lies in their interpretation of 
commodification, both as a historical process and as a generalized state” (2007, 551, 
original emphasis).  Advocates of the two models have conflicting views of the market, in 
other words, as neoliberals see it as “the optimal mechanism for allocating property to 
productive individuals,” while the populist view “assumes that the market is a vehicle for 
theft and exploitation,” where individuals own property not necessarily because they 
labored on it, but because they possess economic and political power (552).   
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 The importance of relationships of power is central to many critiques of MLAR.  
In comparing case studies of MLAR around the globe, Raj Patel (2006) finds that 
“Perhaps the single unifying critique…is the stubborn refusal of market-led land reform 
policies to acknowledge the existence of differences in power between those who control 
land and those who do not” (98). Saturnino Borras (2006) argues that “the fundamental 
problem with mainstream thinking about land policy…lies in its purely economic 
consideration of relationships” (111).  For him, this view takes “a generally ahistorical 
view of the problem of landlessness and limits its concerns to the issue of economic 
efficiency today” (126), thus ignoring the “multidimensional character” of land, which 
includes “political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions” (121).  Further, citing 
Anna Tsing’s argument, Borras asserts that “property rights are not things; they are social 
relationships,” and while MLAR effectively ignores these relationships, they are the very 
thing “that land reform in its conventional sense is supposed to reform” (110).   
 Courville and Patel (2006) also recognize the importance of power dynamics and 
social relations to land, and argue that the “neoliberalization of agrarian policy” has led to 
the denial of any alternatives to this model within mainstream economic and development 
discourse (6).  Like the neoliberal model in general, the market-led approach to agrarian 
reform has become hegemonic.  Further, what was once considered a national issue has 
become a common feature of structural adjustment agreements and a condition of loans 
from IFIs.  As Courville and Patel note, these land reforms “are now framed by 
considerations of equity and production efficiency arbitrated by the World Bank, with the 
full support of international finance institutions and their network of local elites” (2006, 
6).  Zoomers and van der Haar concur, noting that many of these IFIs “have abandoned 
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their previous attitude of non-intervention in such sensitive political matters as land 
reform, and are now actively involved in the promotion of new land laws, land titling, 
and registration projects” (2000, 18).  As a result, earlier reform programs are often 
dismantled, leading collective land holdings to be parceled out and exchanged freely21 on 
the market (Zoomers 2000a, 59).  This is exactly what happened with the imposition of 
neoliberal agricultural policy in Honduras, which reversed several decades of agrarian 
reform policies and drastically altered the social, political, and agricultural landscapes of 
the nation. 
 Scholars and practitioners increasingly agree that the purported benefits of MLAR 
have failed to materialize (see, for example, “Global Campaign” n.d.).  Several argue that 
these policies have failed to reduce rural poverty (Rosset 2006; Zoomers 2000b); and in 
many cases they have actually served to deepen it (Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay, and 
McKinley 2007; Mondragón 2006).  Zoomers also notes that “results are rather variable 
and often disappointing” in terms of efficiency and equity in land distribution, as well as 
economic growth (2000b, 290).  
 Others stress the point that the limitations of previous SLAR programs have less 
to do with the model itself than with entrenched structures of power.  As Carmen Diana 
Deere argues, “the limited agrarian reform efforts of the past failed, not because of 
intrinsic problems of peasant agriculture but because of the lack of political will among 
elites in the face of entrenched resistance from the landlord class” (2006, x).  These 
phenomena cannot be addressed by market-led agrarian reforms, as this model merely 
                                                 
21 I use this term cautiously, as the extent to which these transactions are “free” can certainly be called into 
question, as alluded to earlier in this chapter (e.g. Magdoff’s “extra-economic means”), and as I discuss 
further in Chapter III. 
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“exacerbates the power differences between those who control land and those who do not 
in favor of the former” (Deere 2006, x). 
 A question then remains regarding the future of agrarian reform.  Many authors 
writing on the subject specifically cite the need for agrarian reform that is not purely 
economic in nature, but that also takes seriously political issues and power dynamics on 
local and global scales (Veltmeyer 2005; Rosset 2006; Moyo and Yeros 2005).  As Peter 
Rosset argues, many “have tended to depoliticize the problem of landlessness, which by 
its nature can be addressed only by structural changes of a kind that fall squarely in the 
sphere of politics, rather than that of the market” (2006, 309).  He proposes a model of 
“bubble up economics,” based on “redistribution of productive assets to the poorest 
strata” as an alternative to the failed “trickle down” model of wealth redistribution (317).  
Similarly for Moyo and Yeros, “economistic approaches to agrarian reform will continue 
to suffer unless the political dimensions of reforms are taken seriously, and the political 
grip of large capital broken” (2005, 23, original emphasis).  For Courville and Patel, 
“Successful land reform will be, in a word, political” (2006, 12).  Monica Dias Martins 
argues that it is not enough “simply to call for land redistribution to incorporate more 
farmers into the capitalist system;” she argues instead for an alternative approach that 
would require “shifting the entire agrarian structure of production, power, and cultural 
relations.  This means that the whole economic-social-political system would have to be 
changed” (2006, 268).  As Akram-Lodhi, Borras, Kay, and McKinley similarly 
recognize: 
 Granted it is important to reform and improve the relationship between people and 
 land in the context of economic activities.  Nonetheless, the basis for and 
 imperatives of truly transformational land policies are the urgent and necessary 
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 reforms of relationships within and between households, communities, and 
 different social classes and groups, that often have competing political-economic 
 and socio-cultural interests linked together in a variety of ways by their 
 association to land.  (2007, 391) 
 
 While the types of change these authors call for may appear unattainable, the case 
studies presented in Promised Land:  Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform can be 
taken together as evidence that transformational change is possible.  In her foreword to 
the text, Carmen Diana Deere argues that “redistributionary agrarian reform could be the 
pillar of an alternative model of development to neoliberalism, one built on food 
sovereignty – favoring national agriculture over imports – and sustainable development – 
prioritizing small farmers over corporate agriculture” (2006, xi).  Whether such agrarian 
change could effectively challenge the larger neoliberal agenda remains to be seen, but it 
would almost certainly have positive effects for the people and communities it directly 
affected.  In Chapter V, I discuss a new agrarian reform law that the campesino 
movements of the Aguán and their allies have proposed to the Honduran Congress.  This 
proposed law addresses many of the issues discussed in the previous section, and largely 
fits the model of reform called for by the scholars cited here. 
Political Violence  
 I return now to the issue of the coercive arm of the state.  In this section, I 
specifically consider the reasoning by which political violence is employed in the 
neoliberal context, and present theoretical tools that can help us better understand its 
prevalence in the case of contemporary Honduras.  While the use of both state-sponsored 
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and state-sanctioned violence22 to further the interests of political and economic elites is 
an unfortunately well-established tradition in Latin America and beyond, the particular 
iteration of this phenomenon that plagues the Aguán today is directly related, I argue, to 
the themes outlined in this chapter. 
 The enduring presence of political violence in modern democracies is a problem 
that scholars across the social sciences and humanities continually grapple with.  
Following the work of Max Weber, we commonly agree that the state holds a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force or violence within a society.  That supposedly non-
authoritarian states exercise this force against their own citizens in illegal and unjust 
ways appears contradictory, yet is a common feature in many democracies.  For Diane 
Davis (2010), the persistence of state violence in contemporary Latin America may 
largely be attributed to “the path-dependent consequences of past political decisions 
about economic development, state formation, and industrialization,” while “the current 
intensification of long-standing problems of violence owes as much to the wholehearted 
embrace of liberalization, both political and economic, as to the weight of history” (38, 
original emphasis).  In other words, this phenomenon is the result of both historical 
processes and the recent adoption of neoliberal policies.   
                                                 
22 I make a distinction here between state-sponsored and state-sanctioned violence, as they are, at least in 
theory, two discrete notions.  I define the former as illegal or unjust repression originating directly from 
state actors, such as military and police forces.  The latter may be thought of as similar repression 
perpetrated by non-state actors who enjoy some degree of political power and impunity for their actions.  
As we will see in this section, the lines between these two types of violence are often blurred, as state and 
non-state actors often have shared interests and thus collude to perpetrate violence.  In the case of 
Honduras, both state-sponsored and state-sanctioned violence are widespread, and the distinctions between 
these actors are most definitely unclear.  For the sake of simplicity, I will talk about them here together 
within the frame of “political violence.” 
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Violence in the Neoliberal State 
 Recalling Harvey’s discussion of the contradictions between the theoretically 
non-interventionist neoliberal state and its frequent mobilization of force “to protect 
corporate interests and, if necessary, to repress dissent” (Harvey 2005, 77), we begin to 
see the grounds on which this use of force is justified.  Scholars make direct connections 
between political violence and the logic of the neoliberal state.  In Violent Democracies 
in Latin America, Arias and Goldstein argue that political violence is “much more than a 
social aberration;” it is more correctly viewed as “a mechanism for keeping in place the 
very institutions and policies that neoliberal democracies have fashioned over the past 
several decades” (2010, 5).  Primary among these are those that “provide a stable and 
secure field for transnational investment and individual self-realization” (2010, 15), 
which would certainly include the protection of markets and individual property rights.  
For Naomi Klein, “The bottom line is that while Friedman’s [neoliberal] economic model 
is capable of being partially imposed under democracy, authoritarian conditions are 
required for the implementation of its true vision” (2007, 11).   
 If, as many economists and policy makers have argued, neoliberal economic 
policies were intended to bring – or even capable of bringing – prosperity to all, it would 
not follow that force would be required to implement them.  However, if these policies 
primarily serve elite and corporate interests and have overwhelmingly negative results for 
the majority of the population, as many scholars cited in this chapter argue, it is then 
understandable that force would be needed to repress popular opposition to these policies 
and their consequences.    
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 Arias and Goldstein also connect the high levels of social violence that persist 
throughout Latin America to neoliberalism, arguing that this is “not the simple result of 
institutional failure but the logical outcome of neoliberal democracy’s unfolding” (2010, 
16), where social violence ultimately becomes “an instrument for coping with the myriad 
problems that neoliberal democracies have generated” (5).  As we have seen, the results 
of this system include increased social and economic inequality, heightened levels of 
poverty, and “declining public confidence in the representative nature of many neoliberal 
states” (Arias and Goldstein 2010, 16), as well as increased “social and political 
marginalization of the poorer sectors” and “the manifest depoliticization of the populace” 
(Silva 2004, 187).  
 
Theoretical Tools for Understanding Political Violence 
 It is important to recognize the complexity with which political violence 
manifests in society.  Here I briefly present two theoretical concepts that I find useful in 
thinking about violence, particularly in terms of complicating facile distinctions between 
what constitutes political versus social violence. 
 As Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (2004) recognize, widespread political and 
social violence persist in Latin American democracies, and have in fact “acquired greater 
variation and new dimensions beyond the conventional state and insurgent violence of the 
past” (6).  They term this “new violence,” and argue that because of it “one of the most 
noteworthy characteristics of contemporary Latin American societies is the de facto 
existence of formal constitutionalism, (electoral) democracy and an often vibrant civil 
society on the one hand, and the use of force to stake out power domains or pursue 
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economic or political interests on the other” (6).  Perhaps their most useful observation is 
the acknowledgment that in Latin American societies in particular, with their histories of 
political and social violence stemming from multiple actors, attempts to clearly 
differentiate and classify types of armed actors (for example, state vs. non-state, police 
vs. paramilitary) become difficult.  They note that “most analytical distinctions become 
unfocused or confused when day-to-day situations bring about a systemic interaction 
between the armed actors involved, particularly in local configurations” (11).   
 “Violent Pluralism” is the interdisciplinary framework Arias and Goldstein 
present to help us understand the situation where we see “states, social elites, and 
subalterns employing violence in the quest to establish or contest regimes of citizenship, 
justice, rights, and a democratic social order” (2010, 4-5).  They argue, much like 
Koonings and Kruijt, that Latin American nations are plagued by “an immense diversity 
of forms of violence” (20), and that while the particulars vary by context, it is common 
that “multiple violent actors operate within the polity and maintain different and changing 
connections to state institutions and political leaders, whether those states are officially 
democratic, authoritarian, or otherwise” (21).   
 I find the concept of violent pluralism particularly useful in thinking about 
conflicts between states, elites, and popular movements in contemporary Latin America.  
The approach, as Arias and Goldstein argue, “helps us develop a fuller conception of 
what relationships civil society and violent actors maintain to one another and to different 
elements of the state, including politicians, police, bureaucrats, and the military” (21).  It 
also allows us to conceptualize these as dynamic relationships that are constantly shifting 
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in relation to the political and economic context and myriad other factors, and helps to 
create analytic space where “we can begin to ask what effects these arrangements have on 
politics and social relations” (22).  This approach, the authors assert, “should help open a 
conceptual space through which we can understand in a more nuanced and sophisticated 
way the challenges facing these polities and their inhabitants” and “can more effectively 
contribute to some of the larger policy debates that exist today” (32). 
 In the case of Honduras, the factors that drive political violence are largely 
apparent, and fit tremendously well with the scholarly work outlined above.  The state 
has faced increasing resistance to the implementation of neoliberal policies and to the 
clear privileging of business and elite interests over those of the average citizen.  In the 
Aguán specifically, popular movements have coalesced to resist the LMDSA and its 
hugely detrimental impacts on campesino communities and the natural environment.  
While these resistance movements are explicitly nonviolent, they have been met with 
great repression from the state and the private security forces of powerful landholders.  
Using the concept of violent pluralism is instructive here, as it provides a framework to 
help us better understand the relationships between various violent actors and their 
impacts on political and social life and public policy. 
Social Movements  
The study of social movements and contentious politics provides myriad ways in 
which we can think further about these phenomena.  The literature is vast and contains 
multiple theoretical traditions addressing the ways in which movements are formed and 
sustained, and how movement actors frame and articulate their struggles.   The historic 
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lack of consensus among scholars of social movements illustrates the challenges involved 
in attempting to develop a single theoretical framework that accounts for the emergence 
of collective action among diverse peoples, with diverse realities, in diverse parts of the 
world.  That this endeavor has been largely unsuccessful should perhaps not be 
surprising, nor should it be viewed as a failure; rather, the recognition of the importance 
of context and unique, situated political economic histories should be viewed as a step 
toward more meaningful social movement theories.23  I will not trace or attempt to 
summarize these scholarly conversations here; instead I focus my discussion on the 
particular nature of popular movements in the neoliberal context, and then introduce the 
political process model, which I find to be most salient to the case of the Aguán.  I 
discuss the specific components of the political process model in greater detail in Chapter 
IV, within the context of campesino movements in the Aguán. 
Theorizing Social Movements in the Neoliberal Context 
 A fair amount of the social movements literature focuses on rural movements in 
Latin America and beyond, as these have been recognized as leading the popular struggle 
against neoliberalism.  The Zapatistas of Chiapas, Mexico, and Brazil’s Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) are particularly important in this regard, and 
many of the scholars cited in this thesis draw their insights from work with these 
movements.24  Deere and Royce specifically connect the relatively recent increase in 
                                                 
23 For further discussion of the relevance of theory, see Bevington and Dixon (2005). 
 
24 There are many important parallels between these movements and the contemporary campesino 
movements in the Aguán.  As Vergara-Camus (2009) recognizes, the Zapatistas and the MST challenge 
scholars’ previously-held conceptions of “peasant rebellions,” and I believe the movements in the Aguán 
can similarly help us understand this new moment in contentious politics.  While space limitations prevent 
me from exploring these relationships here, I hope to do so in a future project. 
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social movement activity in Latin America to changes in global political economy, and in 
particular to the impacts of neoliberalism and structural adjustment (2009, 1).  They 
further argue that “the current dynamism of the rural social movements is in large 
measure related to the unprecedented attack on rural livelihoods unleashed by the 
neoliberal model of development” (1), which “has had a devastating impact on peasant 
economies nearly everywhere” (5).   
 The relationships between neoliberalism and social movement activity have 
become an important focus of scholarship.  As Petras and Veltmeyer (2011) observe, 
“ordinary people and popular classes were quite disposed to resist these forces of 
capitalist development and change – to organize collectively and take action against the 
policies and institutions of the ruling class, including the model of neoliberal 
globalization used to advance the interests of the capitalist class and their imperialist 
backers” (1).  In his introduction to Globalization and the Politics of Resistance, Barry 
Gills further articulates these relationships, as he argues that “The paradox of neoliberal 
economic globalization is that it both weakens and simultaneously activates the social 
forces of resistance” (2002, 3).  He continues:  
 The key political tension in the coming era will be between the forces of 
 neoliberal economic globalization, seeking to expand the freedom of capital, and 
 the forces of social resistance, seeking to preserve and to redefine community and 
 solidarity.  It is by acts of resistance that we will establish our solidarities and our 
 identities in the ‘era’ of globalization.” (3, original emphasis) 
These observations challenge us to consider the ways in which both the claims of social 
movements and the nature of popular contention are shaped by the contemporary 
historical moment and, in particular, by the nature of the global political economy.  
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Social movement leaders are undoubtedly aware of these factors and the tensions that 
result from them, as are the movements’ allies. 
 This calls our attention to an important feature of the increasingly globalized 
context in which movements operate – the sophisticated networks of which they are part.  
Transnational activist networks (TANs) are often the means through which displays of 
solidarity with social movements manifest.  Keck and Sikkink (1998) note that one of the 
situations in which TANs are likely to be beneficial to local movements is when 
“channels between domestic groups and their government are blocked or hampered or 
where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict” (12).  Keck and Sikkink 
developed the term “boomerang pattern” (also referred to as the “boomerang effect”) to 
discuss the phenomenon we see when local movements or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) employ TANs to pressure an intransigent state on their behalf (12-
3).  This tactic can potentially be successful because the TAN has access to the state that 
the local movement lacks, in addition to the ability to use resources and information as 
leverage against the state (12).  These networks are thus an important tool with which 
movements can amplify the impact of their efforts. 
 The preceding observations illustrate the multiple factors that shape the nature of 
social movements and the contexts in which they operate.  Many models of social 
movement activity fail to capture the complexity of these relationships, thus overlooking 
important aspects of contention.  I argue that McAdam’s political process creates space 
for this complexity, and thus largely transcends the limitations of other approaches. 
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Political Process Model 
 In the second edition of Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930-1970, Doug McAdam articulates his revised political process model.  
Through this model, McAdam seeks to “explore possibilities for theoretical synthesis 
across nominally distinct structuralist, culturalist, and rationalist approaches to the study 
of collective action” (1999, vii).  He explains the impetus for this synthesis in the 
following observation: 
 Increasingly, one finds scholars from various countries and nominally different 
 theoretical traditions emphasizing the importance of the same three broad sets of 
 factors in analyzing the origins of collective action.  These three factors are: 1) the 
 political opportunities and constraints confronting a given challenger; 2) the forms 
 of organization (informal as well as formal) available to insurgents as sites for 
 initial mobilization; and 3) the collective process of interpretation, attribution and 
 social construction that mediate between opportunity and action. (1999, viii)   
McAdam also refers to these as political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes, respectively, which is the terminology I will use in my discussion of the model 
in relation to campesino movements in Chapter IV.  I find this model to be tremendously 
useful in understanding the complicated dynamics of social movement activity, and as 
such his approach largely informs my analysis of contentious politics in the Aguán.  I will 
elaborate on each of these three areas further in that chapter, directly connecting them to 
the case study at hand. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the theoretical relationships between 
neoliberalism, contemporary agrarian issues, political violence, and social movement 
activity, and has foreshadowed the ways in which these are important to the 
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contemporary conflict in the Aguán Valley of Honduras.  I have attempted to capture the 
complex dynamics involved in these phenomena, while also maintaining the ability to 
examine them as distinct concept and processes. 
 The political process and violent pluralism frameworks, in particular, demonstrate 
the ways in which institutions, political and economic systems, and social, cultural, and 
historical processes combine to shape a given situation.  Interrogating the nature of the 
neoliberal context helps us understand why it gives rise to social movements and political 
violence.  Both of these phenomena are responses to the dire economic and social 
conditions that result from neoliberal policies – one reflecting popular sentiment to 
change these conditions, and the other reflecting the lengths to which the elite and the 
neoliberal state will go to in order to maintain the status quo.  In the next chapter, I 
consider these factors in an analysis of the Ley de Modernización. 
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  CHAPTER III 
LA LEY DE MODERNIZACIÓN Y DESARROLLO DEL SECTOR AGRÍCOLA:  A 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
 By the late 1980s, the influence of the Washington Consensus was firmly 
entrenched in the global political economic sphere.  The international debt crisis had 
begun to spiral out of control, as nation after nation struggled to meet its obligations to 
foreign creditors.  The solution, as promoted by the World Bank, IMF, and other 
multilateral institutions, consisted of the by now standard set of reforms – market 
liberalization, public divestment, and so forth.  As governments adopted these Structural 
Adjustment Projects (SAPs), political, social, and economic landscapes underwent drastic 
changes on both global and local scales.  Importantly, as Veltmeyer, Petras and Vieux 
(1997) note, these SAPs represented a significant shift in the theoretical orientation of the 
multilateral institutions: 
 The [debt] crisis also resulted in a dramatic change in the priorities of the 
 international lending agencies – from a professed concern for poverty alleviation 
 and meeting the poor’s basic needs to securing the capacity and willingness of 
 debtor countries to service their debts.  And there was a similar radical shift in the 
 economic policies pursued and in many cases imposed on Latin American 
 regimes.  By the end of the decade virtually all regimes in the region had adopted 
 a neoliberal policy program of macroeconomic stabilization (fiscal balance and 
 deflation) and structural adjustment (trade liberalization, market deregulation, 
 privatization of state enterprises, and downsizing/modernization of the state). (16)  
 
55 
 
 The government of Honduras was in no way immune to this trend.  Over the 
course of the 1980s, its foreign debt had nearly doubled, reaching approximately US$3 
billion by the end of 1987 (World Bank 1994).  This debt, equal to nearly 70 percent of 
the nation’s annual GDP at the time (Kerssen 2013, 22), had clearly become 
unmanageable.  As such, the government began negotiations with the World Bank, 
asking for its assistance in implementing a “major macroeconomic adjustment program 
through a series of Bank-supported operations in the agriculture, public sector, trade, and 
financial sectors” (World Bank 1994).  Honduras’s SAP was officially adopted via 
Decreto 18-90 in March of 1990, and consisted of “the typical combination of 
privatization, liberalization and deflationary monetary policy” (Kerssen 2013, 22).   Its 
theoretical orientation and objectives were later described by the World Bank (1994) in 
the following way: 
 The essential aim of the Government’s program was to stabilize the economy 
 while laying the basis for addressing major macroeconomic constraints affecting 
 long-term recovery and growth.  In addition, by supporting productive 
 employment it would enhance living conditions of the majority of the population.  
 This would take place through reform of the public sector and public investment 
 program, improved balance of payments management, credit and monetary 
 policies and financial sector reform. (n.p.) 
 
 
 The general approach embodied in the nation’s SAP was subsequently 
implemented through a number of sector-specific actions and policies.  In the agricultural 
sector, indications of a sea change began with the privatization of the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (IHMA) in early 1991.  This resulted in the elimination of 
national policies that controlled imports and exports of basic grains, as well as “price 
guarantees for staples like corn, beans, rice, chicken and milk, leaving both farmers and 
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consumers at the mercy of the global market” (Kerssen 2013, 23).  Later that year, the 
Action Plan for Central American Agriculture (PAC) would enact similar policies on a 
regional level.  The cumulative effect of these policies, as Tanya Kerssen of Food 
First/The Institute for Food & Development Policy notes, led to a sharp rise in 
agricultural imports, thus “devastating the basic grains sector and transforming 
consumption patterns” in Honduras” (2013, 23). 
 With local campesinos already reeling from the impacts of structural adjustment 
in Honduras and the broader regional shift toward neoliberalism that it coincided with, 
the Ley de Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola (Law of Modernization and 
Development of the Agricultural Sector, or LMDSA), was introduced.  While large 
landowners and ranchers were united in their support for the new policy, the public, 
campesino groups, and government officials in the sector were largely divided on the 
issue (Pino 1992, 34).  Despite a great deal of popular opposition, the LMDSA was 
quickly approved by the National Congress in early March of 1992, via Decreto 31-92.   
 This law has had indisputable impacts on the lives of rural Hondurans, and 
remains central in national policy discussions today.  It was, in many ways, the 
quintessential neoliberal reform. Though a domestic policy, the influence of the global 
development industry in its creation is evident – not only did the policy stem from a 
World Bank-brokered SAP, but the language of the law itself was penned by Roger 
Norton, a USAID economist.25  
 In this chapter, I specifically focus on the LMDSA and its impacts.  I examine the 
rationale behind the policy, seeking to understand the dynamics involved in its 
                                                 
25 The LMDSA is sometimes referred to as the “Norton Law,” for this reason. 
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implementation while also locating these within the global political economic context.  I 
then consider the outcomes of the LMDSA, contrasting these with the objectives stated in 
the policy itself.  I aim to provide an analysis of this important policy that takes seriously 
issues of political and economic power, and recognizes the need for a holistic approach to 
policy analysis that goes well beyond purely economic concerns. 
Problem Definition and Policy Approach 
 The adoption of the LMDSA was predicated on two theoretical assumptions held 
by policymakers at the time:  the superiority of neoliberal economic policy, as asserted by 
multilateral financial institutions dominated by the Global North, and the perceived 
failure of agrarian reform in Honduras.  As previously discussed, global development 
discourse of this time was dominated by adherents to neoliberal economic policy.  
Institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and USAID held very specific ideas regarding 
“development” – what it meant, why some nations lacked it, and how those nations 
should go about achieving it.  The neoliberal approach was widely lauded as the solution 
to the economic “backwardness” that was blamed for so much poverty in nations of the 
Global South. Specific kinds of macroeconomic policies were thus implemented, justified 
on the grounds that they would generate wealth which would then “trickle down” to 
benefit the average citizen.   
 There is no question that Honduras was facing serious social and economic 
challenges at the time of its structural adjustment.  As expressed by the World Bank in 
1993, among Honduras’s problems at the time were “widespread poverty, low social 
indicators, severe indebtedness, institutional weaknesses, and economic dependence on 
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two major export commodities” (6).26  The World Bank perceived these problems as the 
direct results of “inefficiencies in the marketplace and in the public sector” (1993, 6), 
therefore designating these as the realms in which feasible solutions would lie.  
Additionally, as the agricultural sector was central to the Honduran economy, reforms in 
this arena became a fundamental part of the national development agenda.  Policymakers 
thus presented the LMDSA as a means to address the larger issues facing Honduras by 
way of increasing the profitability of one of its primary sectors via neoliberal 
mechanisms.  “Modernizing” the agricultural sector, they argued, would result in 
economic development, which would inherently benefit the people of Honduras.   
 Policymakers also portrayed the LMDSA as a means to address the perceived 
limitations and failures of the agrarian reform programs of the 1960s and ‘70s, though in 
a very indirect manner.  It is certainly true that agrarian reform in Honduras had been 
flawed and, in many ways, incomplete.  Despite the fact that some 60,000 families had 
received land on which to live and farm, landlessness and rural poverty remained serious 
issues (FIAN 2000).  As part of agrarian reform, the state had failed to provide adequate 
technical assistance and the access to credit needed to support the incipient peasant 
cooperatives and allow them to compete with wealthy agro-industrialists.  Lands granted 
through agrarian reform were often of poor quality and allotted in parcels that were too 
small to effectively support families.  Additionally, a lack of government capacity in 
administering the program led to poor record-keeping and, consequently, 
misunderstandings and conflicts over property rights.  These, however, were not the 
                                                 
26 These two export commodities were bananas and coffee, which at the time accounted for more than 60% 
of agricultural export revenues (World Bank 1993). 
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issues that the Honduran government and its multilateral partners focused on in their 
agricultural reforms.   
 For proponents of the LMDSA, the primary concern at hand was the economic 
productivity of the agricultural sector, particularly in terms of agricultural exports and the 
presence of a well-functioning land market.  Subsistence agriculture was not deemed an 
economically profitable venture in the dominant development discourse, and thus state-
led agrarian reform (SLAR) intended to redistribute land to campesino families was not a 
viable policy option, regardless of how well the program itself functioned.  The 
theoretical divide between those who conceived of and drafted the LMDSA and the 
campesinos of rural Honduras is evident in this observation by Tanya Kerssen (2013): 
Aguán settlers did in fact cultivate food.  Gould (1986) describes how the Aguán 
co-ops assigned individual plots to each family for the production of corn and 
beans for consumption, which were grown without pesticides or fertilizers 
(compared to input-intensive oil palm).  But policy makers saw peasant 
subsistence as an obstacle to development instead of a desirable outcome – a view 
strongly reinforced by international aid agencies then and now.  This helps to 
explain why by the 1990s, the co-ops were widely seen as a failure: Aguán 
peasants were still producing far too much food and not enough oil palm to keep 
the processing plants competitive. (20, my emphasis) 
 
 Policymakers, therefore, viewed endemic rural poverty and landlessness as policy  
problems that could – and in fact, should – be address via market-based solutions.  A shift 
from subsistence agriculture to agro-industrial production was deemed the policy solution 
that would “modernize” the Aguán.  These priorities are clearly reflected in the language 
of the law itself, and in the nature of the goals it expresses.  The primary objectives of the 
LMDSA, as stated in Article 4 of its text are as follows: 
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a) To establish the proper conditions for producers, whatever their form of 
organization or company, to develop their activities of the production of food 
and other agricultural products in an efficient manner by ensuring the 
conservation and rational use of the soil, water, forests, and flora and fauna; 
b) To consolidate the organization and institutionalization of the agricultural 
public sector and lay the groundwork for the rationalization and to improve 
the coordination of their activities; 
c) To establish an appropriate framework that encourages investment in the field, 
fair remuneration to agricultural producers, and the generation of rural 
employment in order to achieve food security and improve the living 
conditions of the rural population; 
d) To promote agro-industrial development and the export of agricultural 
products; 
e) To stimulate the internal and external marketing of agricultural products, 
preferably by means of entities created on the initiative of the people who 
produce; 
f) To ensure the expansion of the agricultural sector by improving the 
channeling of financial resources to the producers through state or private 
lending institutions; 
g) To strengthen the services of technology generation and transfer to the 
producers, and promote the establishment and development of private centers 
with those purposes; 
h) To secure a suitable framework of security of land tenure and access that 
enables businessmen and businesswomen who are not owners to make 
productive investments in the field through lease agreements with rural 
owners, or by joint investment mechanisms with independent farmers and 
beneficiaries of agrarian reform; 
i) To guide the expansion of agricultural activities into forms of farming that are 
compatible with the conservation and good management of natural resources, 
protection of the environment, and ecological balance of the country; and 
j) Others compatible with the above objectives.  (Congreso Nacional 1992, my 
translation) 
 
 It is important to note that these objectives are nearly exclusively economic in 
nature, with some inclusion of environmental concerns.  This reflects the nature of the 
Honduran government’s development strategy of the time, which in turn was largely 
shaped by that of the dominant global institutions and the requirements of their structural 
adjustment plan.   
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The LMDSA and Agrarian Reform  
 The LMDSA, as we can clearly see, is an example of market-led agrarian reform 
(MLAR).  As Charles Brockett (1998) observes, the adoption of the LMDSA 
“symbolized the change in government policy from agrarian reform to the promotion of 
commercial agriculture and the parallel reduction in the role of the state in agriculture, as 
the government turned instead to market forces” (198).  Redistribution of public and 
under-utilized land to landless families had become a strategy of the past. 
 One of the primary components of this policy was what Kerssen (2013) calls the 
“implementation of land tenure ‘modernization,’ shorthand for privatizing and 
individualizing land titles so that they could be bought and sold on the free market” (29).  
Prior to the LMDSA, lands distributed via agrarian reform, which were collectively held 
by peasant cooperatives, were prohibited from being exchanged in the marketplace.  If a 
family chose to leave the co-op, the ownership of their individual parcel reverted to the 
co-op.  If an entire co-op were to dissolve, their lands were to be purchased by the INA, 
so they could be reallocated to other landless Hondurans through the reform process 
(Ríos 2010, 3).  Under no circumstance were agrarian reform lands to be purchased or 
sold on the market.  The LMDSA reversed these provisions, however, allowing for 
collectively-held land to be parceled out and bought and sold freely, or for entire co-ops 
to be sold to individuals or firms.  These changes radically altered the dynamics of land 
ownership and notions of property rights in Honduras. 
 This feature of the LMDSA effectively reversed both the specific legal provisions 
and the larger spirit of the agrarian reform policy of the previous three decades. As 
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Kerssen (2013) notes, “It represented a shift from a national ‘land to the tiller’ paradigm 
to a so-called ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ paradigm promoted by the World Bank” (29).  
In the introduction to a recent publication of the text of the Agrarian Reform Law, the 
editors argue that, “with the LMDSA, the resource of land was subjected to the free play 
of supply and demand and the concept that it should fulfill its ‘social function’ was 
turned into a thing of the past” (Editorial Guaymuras 2004, 11, my translation).  Pedro 
Emilio Marchetti (2001) similarly argues that, “in the current legislation, the social 
function of land is defined by purely technical-economistic criteria” (14, my translation).  
In fact, many have deemed the policy unconstitutional,27 as it directly negates the 
mandate for agrarian reform as expressed in Chapter III of the Constitution of Honduras: 
  
 Article 344.  Agrarian Reform is an integral process and an instrument of 
 transformation of the agrarian structure of the country, intended to replace the 
 latifundio (large estate) and the minifundio (smallholding) with a system of 
 ownership, tenancy, and use of the land that guarantees social justice in the field 
 and increases the production and productivity of the agricultural sector.  
  
 So is declared the need and public utility for the implementation of Agrarian 
 Reform. 
 
 Article 345.  Agrarian Reform constitutes an essential part of the overall
 development strategy of the Nation, therefore the other economic and social 
 policies the Government approves should be formulated and executed in a 
 harmonious way with it, especially those having to do with, among others, 
 education, housing, employment, infrastructure, marketing, and technical 
 assistance and credit. 
 
 Agrarian Reform will be implemented in such a way as to ensure the effective 
 participation of campesinos, on equal terms with other sectors of production, in 
 the process of economic, social, and political development of the Nation.  (my 
 translation) 
 
                                                 
27 For example, see “Todos y nadie contra el ajuste estructural” in Revista Envío (1992, 7). 
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 The contradictions between the Constitutional mandate for agrarian reform and 
the content of the LMDSA are obvious.  While the Constitution speaks to the issues of 
social justice and direct involvement of campesinos in the development process, the 
LMDSA focuses on issues of economic efficiency and market stimulation.  Though in 
theory these concerns need not be mutually exclusive, in practice the privileging of the 
latter have had dire consequences for many.   
 Here the critiques scholars have put forth regarding MLAR and the many 
questions raised in the literature regarding the suitability of the market in allocating land 
become important.  Can market-based reform lead to an equitable and efficient 
distribution of land?  Whose interests are privileged in this system?  Does this kind of 
reform exclude the very individuals state-led reform is designed to benefit?  I now turn to 
a discussion of the outcomes of the LMDSA, keeping these questions and critiques in 
mind. 
Outcomes of La Ley de Modernización 
 The outcomes of neoliberal economic policies and SAPs in Latin America have 
been well documented.  While there are certainly variations between cases, there is a 
great deal of agreement among scholars that these policy trends have been unfavorable to 
the majority of people in Latin American nations.28  Veltmeyer, Petras & Vieux (1997) 
portray the situation as such:  
 The overall effect of structural adjustment in Latin America has been to shift 
 wealth upward to the domestic dominant classes and outward to foreign 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Veltmeyer, Petras and Vieux (1997); Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007); Kay (2007); 
Tiney (2009). 
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 creditors.  Stabilization and adjustment measures have decreased real wages and 
 raised the cost of living through devaluations and the shrinking of state 
 expenditures by means of cuts in subsidies for popular consumption and the 
 removal of price controls, cuts in spending on welfare programs and other 
 expenditure reductions….In short, structural adjustment has contributed to a shift 
 in the balance of class power away from the popular classes and toward domestic 
 dominant classes and their foreign allies. (73) 
 
 In Honduras, the LMDSA has produced economic gain for some. The equity with 
which the benefits of this policy have been enjoyed by the people of Honduras and the 
degree to which many of the proposed objectives were fulfilled may certainly, however, 
be called into question.  An examination of specific outcomes of the LMDSA – both in 
comparison with the policy’s stated objectives and also those that were, perhaps, 
unintended – will shed light on the effectiveness of this specific policy and the general 
development strategy of which it was part.  These outcomes are often interrelated and 
interdependent, but I will attempt to examine them as discrete phenomena here. 
Increase in Exports  
 Among the objectives stated in the text of the LMDSA was the intensification of 
agro-industrial production, both for local consumption and export markets.  Particular 
emphasis was placed on agricultural exports, as these played an important part in the 
national economy, and as the purchasing power of the majority of Hondurans was – and 
still is – quite limited.   
 It is true that overall exports as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
increased in the years following structural adjustment.  According to World Bank data 
(2013), overall exports grew from 26% of GDP in 1988 to 47% of GDP in 1996, and 
65 
 
54% in 2000.29  However, much of this growth is accounted for by the massive expansion 
of textile manufacturing operations, or maquilas, in northern Honduras during the same 
period, rather than increases in agricultural exports.  The maquilas soon constituted the 
majority of national exports, in fact, comprising roughly 65% of all exports by 2005 
(Cordero 2009, 1).   
 Therefore, while overall growth in national exports during this period is 
impressive, we would be wrong to assume that the same trends were present in the 
agricultural sector.  If we turn our gaze to that sector specifically, the picture is rather 
different.  The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reports 
that while agricultural exports constituted upwards of 80% of national exports in the late 
1980s, by 2003 this figure had fallen to less than 50% (2003).  Further, agricultural 
production as a percentage of GDP fell from 21.6% in the late 1980s to only 17% by the 
late 1990s, representing increased activity in the manufacturing and other sectors, as 
noted above (FAO 2003).  These figures are significant because the economic gains 
generated by this increase in exports did not benefit small farmers or the average 
Honduran – rather, they were concentrated in the elite business-owning classes, thus 
exacerbating social inequality. 
Increased Rural Poverty and Food Insecurity 
 Despite the government’s expressed objectives of improving food security and the 
living standards of rural Hondurans with the LMDSA, the evidence shows that these 
conditions have worsened in the wake of this policy.  In 2010, the FAO determined that 
                                                 
29 From “Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP).”  
66 
 
Honduras continued to suffer the highest levels of rural poverty in Central America, at 
78.8% (FIDH et al. 2011, 11).  The editors at Guaymuras (2004) directly link the extreme 
hardships faced by rural Hondurans to the LMDSA, stating that: 
 With this law, the small and medium producers have been left on the margin of 
 technical services and credit offered by the state and, even worse, of access to the 
 resource of land.  It is thus no coincidence that the levels of food security, poverty 
 and destitution have been deepened in more than 80% of the rural population. 
 (12, my translation) 
 
 Citing FAO data, Tanya Kerssen also notes that deregulation and liberalization in 
the agricultural sphere, resulting both from the LMDSA and other similar policies in the 
region, was highly detrimental to local food markets.  These changes led to a steep 
increase in agricultural imports, which “grew by over 16 percent per year between 1990 
and 2000,” thus greatly altering local diets (2013, 23).  A 2011 International Fact Finding 
Mission report directly linked this “progressive displacement of basic grain production by 
export crops, accompanied by an excessive concentration of land in the hands of a few 
owners” to heightened food insecurity (FIDH et al.11).  Indeed, as of a 2010 study by 
Honduras’s National Institute of Statistics (INE), 56% of rural households were food 
insecure (Irías n.d., 13).  These figures are staggering in a country that was long known as 
the breadbasket of Central America. 
Expansion of the Agro-Industrial Sector 
 This new emphasis on agro-industrial exports at the expense of food production 
for local consumption allowed for the proliferation of a relatively new cash crop in 
Northern Honduras.  Though African palm had been cultivated there since the 1970s, the 
new policy landscape facilitated massive growth in its production, as Irías (n.d.) notes: 
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 What is clear is that the driving factor of this process of land trading in the Bajo 
 Aguán during the last 20 years has been the interests of the agro-export businesses 
 and the production of African palm for export.… This is evident in the rapid 
 growth of the area in production of African palm, which from 48,000 hectares in 
 1981 grew to 82,100 hectares in 2005, and to 120,000 hectares in 2009.  46% 
 of this area is concentrated in the Bajo Aguán.” (16, my translation) 
  
In fact, by December 2012, African palm had become the second largest agricultural 
export in Honduras (Secretaría 2012).  Unfortunately, this has only exacerbated food 
insecurity in rural areas, as the vast expansion of palm plantations has encroached on land 
that would otherwise be dedicated to growing food crops, and the economic gains that 
have resulted from its expansion have not reached the pockets of campesino families.  
Rather, as Kerssen (2013) notes, “The benefits of this growth have been concentrated in 
the hands of a few powerful, Honduran-based agro-food corporations” (55).  The law 
unquestionably “privileged export crops and established an auspicious legal framework 
for the large agricultural companies” (Editorial Guaymuras 2004, 12). 
Deteriorating Local Economy 
 These changes in the agricultural structure of Northern Honduras have had largely 
negative effects on the local economies of the region. In the case of the Aguán Valley, the 
period of Agrarian Reform brought relative economic security to many.  Gilberto Ríos, 
the national director of FIAN in Honduras, argues that “For more than twenty years 
(1970 – the early 1990s) the firms of the reformed sector30 were the large producers of 
the Bajo Aguán.  The region became one of the most important productive centers of the 
                                                 
30 In other words, the cooperatives created through agrarian reform. 
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country, and Tocoa31 distinguished itself as the fastest growing city in Honduras” (2010, 
5, my translation).  This trend, however, would end with the changes brought to the 
region by the LMDSA.  In his introduction to Miguel Alonzo Macías’s study of the 
impacts of agrarian counter-reform in the Aguán Valley, Marchetti (2001) argues that 
“The central discovery of this study is that, once the lands of the Agrarian Reform were 
purchased by Facussé, Rosenthal, Standard Fruit Company and René Morales,32 the local 
economy went into a recession” (13, my translation).  He further notes that “even though 
the exploitation of lands of African palm has improved under Facussé, Rosenthal, 
Morales, the concentration of land in the hands of these economic classes that isolate 
themselves from the local economy does not achieve a wider social function for the 
wellbeing of the regional economy” (14, my translation). 
 In addition to changing the crops that rural Hondurans were cultivating and 
altering local diets and consumption patterns, the LMDSA also impacted where and how 
they were living.  The deterioration of local economies that had once been relatively 
strong led many to seek employment elsewhere.  As Kerssen (2013) notes, “The collapse 
of smallholder agriculture led to a flood of outmigration, disrupting family structures and 
community life in the countryside” (23).   
Dissolution of Cooperatives and Sale of Collectively-Held Lands 
 The LMDSA drastically changed the nature of land tenure in Northern Honduras, 
and as many argue, nearly led to the destruction of the cooperative structure put in place 
                                                 
31 Tocoa is the primary town in the region. 
 
32 Corporations owned by Miguel Facussé, Jaime Rosenthal, René Morales, Reinaldo Canales, along with 
the Standard Fruit Company, are the largest landowners in the Aguán Valley. 
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by agrarian reform.33  With the elimination of laws preventing the sale of collectively-
held agrarian reform lands, the enactment of the LMDSA coincided with a period of 
massive land transfers in the Aguán.  At first glance, it may have appeared that the World 
Bank’s “willing buyer-willing seller’ paradigm” (Kerssen 2013, 29) was being taken up 
by many cooperatives in the region.  A more critical examination of the circumstances 
under which many of these co-ops were selling their lands, and to whom they were 
selling them, however, brings the validity of this paradigm into question. 
 Many cooperatives did sell their lands in the wake of the LMDSA, nearly 
exclusively to members of the agro-industrial elite.  Within two years of the policy’s 
implementation, nearly 31,000 hectares, or 53.6% of the lands awarded during agrarian 
reform, had been sold by cooperatives (FOSDEH et al. n.d., 19).  While these figures are 
substantial indeed, so too was the duress experienced by many co-ops at the time.  
Already feeling the impacts of structural adjustment and other national and regional 
neoliberal policies, the promise of an immediate influx of cash for their land was often 
too great to resist.  As Kerssen (2013) observes, the reality was that, “Struggling under 
the weight of debt, low returns and rising input costs, highly vulnerable Aguán peasants 
were susceptible to these buyouts” (28).  The lure of cash was not the only factor, 
however, as she further notes, that “These ‘voluntary’ sales were helped along through 
varying degrees of intimidation and manipulation: from bribes to peasant leaders, to 
menacing letters from INA, to violent threats from large landowners (MUCA 2010)” (29) 
– in other words, Magdoff’s (2013) “extra-economic means.”  Even in cases where the 
sales were undertaken legally, the payments that co-ops often received amounted to less 
                                                 
33 Tanya Kerssen (2013) calls the policy “the death knell of agrarian reform” (29). 
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than half of the value of the land (Macías 2001, 40).  Aryeh Shell (2012) reports that land 
was often sold for as little as 1,000 Lempiras per manzana, which translates to roughly 
US$52 for 1.7 acres.  We can thus understand this massive selloff of co-op land as 
resulting from a combination of great financial need within the co-ops and campesino 
families, on the one hand, and external pressure in the form of threats and violence from 
wealthy landowners, on the other.   
 The end result was an extreme blow to the cooperative structure of agriculture in 
Northern Honduras.  Irías found that, “of the 54 cooperatives and associative enterprises 
of African palm organized in the process of agrarian reform, only 9 did not succumb to 
the process of trading in lands” (n.d., 15, my translation).  Similarly, MUCA reports that 
40 of the 57 cooperative companies involved in the cultivation and production of palm oil 
sold their lands during this period (MUCA 2010).  The organization further notes that the 
“phenomenon” of these sales has been widely contested and investigated ever since, both 
in terms of the “motivations [for] and the legal framework of the sales,” and the 
“campaign of intimidation and threats of death against the leaders who opposed the 
negotiations”  (MUCA 2010, my translation).  
Re-concentration of Land and Resources 
 As a result of these land transfers, the LMDSA also dramatically altered land 
ownership patterns.  Within a few years of the implementation of the LMDSA, the 
redistribution of lands to campesinos that occurred through agrarian reform had been 
completely reversed, and land ownership was even more concentrated than before the 
reforms.  This trend was particularly prevalent in the Aguán, where, as Kerssen notes, “In 
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a short period, a few wealthy individuals seized more than 21,000 hectares (over 70 
percent) of peasant lands” (2013, 5) – a rate of land re-concentration some seven times 
higher than that experienced elsewhere in the nation (30).  She importantly connects these 
extreme levels to the fact that the land in this region is the best suited to agro-industrial 
production, as it is among the most fertile and least mountainous terrain in Honduras. 
 With the vast majority of the land in the Aguán now in the hands of wealthy 
landowners, the problem of landlessness – the very problem that spurred the agrarian 
reform of previous decades – once again plagued campesino families.  According to data 
from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), there were 205,000 landless 
families in Honduras in 1998 – an increase from the 126,000 reported in the nation’s 
farming census of 1993 (Irías n.d., 13).  The most recent UNDP Human Development 
Report (2011) cited 161,000 landless families and an additional 116,000 families whose 
land consisted of parcels less than one hectare (roughly 2.5 acres) (57).  So while the 
situation has improved slightly in recent years, overall levels of landlessness remain 
higher today than before the implementation of the LMDSA,34 and the best agricultural 
lands remain highly concentrated in the hands of agro-business.  As such, Macías (2001) 
argues, “There is no doubt that, currently, the greatest problem in the Honduran 
agricultural sector is the lack of equity in the possession of land” (160, my translation). 
 There is little disagreement in the literature regarding this phenomenon of land 
concentration and its relationship to the LMDSA and other similar policies.  Macías 
(2001) calls the LMDSA “nothing more than a form of institutionalizing and 
                                                 
34 See Brockett (1998) for more details.  
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consolidating an agricultural project that benefits the minorities that concentrate the 
productive lands” (160, my translation).  He further criticizes the elite policymakers, 
arguing that their efforts “to distribute land to themselves and their allies and to create 
new latifundios was done with an overconfidence in the new neoliberal culture and a lack 
of seriousness in respect to the laws of the country” (15, my translation).  In the words of 
Tanya Kerssen (2013), “Neoliberalism has set the stage for a massive re-concentration of 
land in the Aguán into the hands of a few influential elites.  Like the industrialists of the 
maquila sector, these individuals were well positioned to benefit from the newly 
liberalized markets in land, trade and investment” (28).   For Gilberto Ríos (2010): 
 the promotion of this concentrated model of property was justified by neoliberals 
 as the condition sine qua non for achieving large and positive results in the 
 development of the country:  the farming activity now in hands of “genuine 
 businessmen” would raise levels of productivity and growth of output to such a 
 degree that the poor population would benefit substantially from the “overflow” 
 effect. (7, my translation) 
 
 It is safe to deduce that the re-concentration of land and resources, then, was not 
an unintended consequence of the LMDSA, but was rather viewed by its advocates as a 
favorable result that would lead to increased agricultural productivity and a subsequent 
“trickle-down” of wealth to the majority of the population.  This latter point is widely 
contested by opponents of neoliberal economic policies, as the postulated “trickle-down 
effect” has generally failed to materialize in the decades following the enactment of these 
policies throughout the globe, as it has failed to do in Honduras.  What is also clear in 
Ríos’s statement is the degree to which the elite tend to see themselves as those who 
should rightly control the means of production and resources of society.  It is then no 
surprise that the policy they chose to adopt produced these results. 
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Reconfiguration of Class Power 
 What follows from these many changes that stemmed from the LMDSA, and 
from structural adjustment and the shift toward neoliberalism more generally, is a 
reconfiguration of class power in Honduras.  While social inequality has long been great 
in the nation and the presence of a powerful elite class is nothing new, the nature and 
orientation of this elite, as well as the implications for the political, economic, and social 
structures of Honduras, deserve further examination. 
 Kerssen (2013) argues that the “Structural adjustment policies of the 
1990s…sparked a massive transfer of state resources to the Honduran private sector, 
granting north coast-based elites unprecedented access to global markets, investment 
capital and political power” (7), thus resulting in what she calls “the consolidation of a 
globally oriented agro-industrial bourgeoisie” (5).  She relates this to David Harvey’s 
recognition of neoliberalism as “a political project to re-establish the conditions for 
capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (2005, 19), rightly 
identifying these relationships and their consequences for Honduras today.  Kerssen 
therefore deems this a “re-configuration of class power” that has resulted in the ongoing 
dominance of the agro-industrial elite in the economic and political realms, ultimately 
leading to the 2009 coup d’état (5).  She concludes: 
 The coup that overthrew president Manuel Zelaya on June 28, 2009 can be read as 
 the expression of a class process set into motion by neoliberal restructuring.  The 
 ‘new’ land grabs in Honduras then, look more like a deepening and intensification 
 of a process already well underway.  Put another way, the grabbing of state power 
 is at least in part, the political consequence of an earlier wave of land grabs. (5, 
 original emphasis) 
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I cite Kerssen’s arguments at length here because they reveal much about the nature of 
the LMDSA and the motivations behind its implementation as they relate to social and 
political power structures in Honduras.   
Outcomes in the Long-Term 
 While the previously mentioned outcomes of the LMDSA materialized primarily 
in the short- and medium-term (though they persist in the present day), there are 
additional, more long-term outcomes that deserve discussion here.  Despite the fact that 
these outcomes are somewhat temporally removed from the policy, their relationship to 
the LMDSA is apparent.  A brief examination of these important outcomes will reinforce 
my and others’ arguments that the contemporary conflict in the Aguán has deep roots in 
this policy of the early 1990s. 
Radicalization of Campesino Movements 
 The radicalization of campesino movements over the past decade is likely an 
unintended consequence of the LMDSA, though it is in many ways not a surprising one.  
The aforementioned outcomes and their indisputable impact on the lives of rural 
Hondurans spurred a level of organizing among campesinos that had not been seen in 
many years.  As Marchetti (2001) argues, elites and policymakers “underestimated the 
capacity for popular response to the conditions of misery created by the counter-reform” 
(15).  Kerssen (2013) concurs: 
 neoliberal restructuring and the militarized response to peasant movements have 
 radicalized the Aguán.  The new movements have gone beyond traditional 
 demands for land redistribution (though these remain central) to demands for a 
 large-scale project of counter-restructuring that restores political and economic 
 power to local communities.  This project necessarily entails a transformation of 
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 state power, or ‘grabbing power back’ from the small class of globalized elites 
 who currently control the state.” (127, original emphasis) 
As I will argue in subsequent chapters, the nature of this resistance and the claims these 
movements stake are largely informed by the outcomes of the LMDSA and the national 
power structures that have consolidated in its wake. 
Militarization and Widespread Political Violence 
 As part of the political project of neoliberalism that has led to the reconfiguration 
of class power in Honduras through the continued entrenchment of an economic and 
political elite, the use of state-sponsored and state-sanctioned violence to enforce this 
elite’s property rights has become commonplace.  As discussed at length elsewhere, the 
Aguán has become a tremendously violent region, where state military and police forces, 
along with private security forces of large landowners, have been accused of countless 
violations of human rights and other acts of repression against the campesino movements.  
This violence has escalated tremendously since the 2009 coup, but the logic behind it can 
be traced to the political project of neoliberalism and the specific conditions created by 
the LMDSA. 
Current Agrarian Conflict 
 It is thus understandable why many, including but not limited to the campesino 
movements and their allies, directly implicate the LMDSA as the catalyst for the current 
agrarian conflict in the Aguán Valley.  It has undeniably contributed to, if not directly 
caused, the conditions that have led campesino movements to engage in active resistance, 
as well as those that have led the state to justify the use of force in the region.  Gustavo 
Irías refers to the LMDSA as “the backdrop” for today’s conflict, and argues that “It is 
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necessary to recognize that the origin of this last cycle of conflict goes back before 
December of 2009 [when the violence in the Aguán began to escalate considerably], its 
starting point being the implementation of the Ley de Modernización Agrícola” (n.d., 14, 
my translation).  Thus, in the minds of many, this policy and the current conflict are 
inextricably linked. 
Conclusion 
 Any analysis of the LMDSA must go beyond an examination of its outcomes as 
compared with the objectives stated in the text to consider the larger policy context of 
which it was an important part.  Deciphering the logic behind this reform and the 
motivations of those who created and implemented it allows us a deeper understanding of 
its repercussions, and ultimately, of the contemporary conflict in the Aguán. 
 Traditionally, policy analysis seeks to assess the efficacy of a given policy based 
on a number of factors.  How, then, do we assess the “efficacy” of the LMDSA?  I argue 
that the answer to this question depends very much on whom you ask and on what criteria 
the analysis is based.  Economists might argue that a lack of effective demand and 
problems related to the implementation of the LMDSA prevented it from achieving its 
declared goals in rural Honduras.  It is certainly true that the creation of a market for land 
could not solve the problem of landlessness in the Aguán or elsewhere if campesino 
families lack the material resources to purchase that land.  It is also true that the 
Honduran state failed to provide the structures that might have helped facilitate this 
effective demand, such as access to sufficient credit and technological supports that 
might allow campesino-led firms to compete with established agribusiness in agricultural 
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export markets.  While these and other critiques of this particular policy are valid, I argue 
that the problems here are ultimately more fundamental.  An analysis that focuses on 
these economic considerations fails to capture the most salient issues related to this 
policy, which have much more to do with power dynamics and entrenched inequality 
than with the law of supply and demand.   
 The LMDSA was, without a doubt, very effective in enriching a handful of elite 
Honduran landowners and helping to solidify their influence in national economic and 
political realms.  It was also effective in re-orienting agricultural production to a focus on 
agro-industrial commodities for export.  What the LMDSA did not do effectively was 
address the structural causes of rural poverty in Honduras or the limitations of earlier 
agrarian reform.  Instead, the new policy of agrarian counter-reform merely furthered the 
agenda of global development institutions and the emerging agro-industrial elite in 
Honduras.  It did not improve the lives of rural Hondurans, I argue, because it was never 
intended to do so in the first place.  Perhaps the makers of this policy did truly believe 
that it would create wealth that would trickle down to the average Honduran to some 
extent, but the policy’s primary focus was clearly agro-business and not campesino 
families.   
 The connection between the LMDSA and the current agrarian conflicts in the 
Aguán and elsewhere, then, is clear.  While the severity of the contemporary situation 
could perhaps not have been anticipated, several analysts weighed in at the time 
regarding the impacts this policy would likely have.  I will quote two of these at length, 
as their predictions were remarkably accurate.  Hugo Noé Pino, at the time a professor in 
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the National Autonomous University of Honduras’s (UNAH) Central American Graduate 
program in Economic and Development Planning (POSCAE), wrote in 1992: 
 The absence of an action that reforms and transforms agriculture will result in 
 high levels of unemployment, higher rates and degrees of poverty, greater 
 dependence on the import of foods, reduction in nutrition levels, greater 
 ecological and environmental degradation, all of which will have a strong impact 
 on the living conditions of the rural resident.  Simultaneously, the rural exodus to 
 urban centers will increase, and the impacts of the application of the Law will also 
 be made present in the cities.  In other words, the Law will affect all Hondurans, 
 including ethnic communities. (11-12, my translation)  
Similarly, Juan Ramón Martínez, former director of the INA under Callejas, stated, as 
quoted in Pino (1992):   
 It is necessary to recognize from the outset that the Ley de Modernización is 
 fundamentally an “agrarian counter-reform” that aims to curb the campesinos’ 
 access to land in accordance to the methodology in practice in the country; to 
 dismantle the developmental capacity of their organizations, both the unions and 
 the economic ones; and to pass the handling of the agrarian conflict from the 
 hands of the current government to the decisions of the few.  Of course, with this 
 last part, the weakest will have no other alternative than to reorganize themselves, 
 with which the level of agricultural clashes – whose institutionalization is obvious 
 to any observer – will rise considerably, generating more unease in agriculture. 
 (34, my translation) 
Finally, researcher Andy Thorpe (1995) references a statement from the Honduran 
newspaper El Tiempo from March 2, 1992, where Monseñor Héctor Enrique Santos, the 
former head of the Catholic Church in Honduras, felt it necessary “to warn that much 
blood would be spilt if the Law was not re-orientated to favour the poor” (206).  
Prophetic words, indeed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FROM THE FIELDS TO THE STREETS:   
CAMPESINO MOVEMENTS IN THE AGUÁN 
 
Introduction 
 The preceding chapters have demonstrated the relationships between neoliberal 
economic policy, political violence, and popular mobilization, both in theory and in 
practice.  They have considered the degree to which the current conflict over land in the 
Aguán is rooted in a specific national policy (the LMDSA) as well as the general nature 
of contemporary global capitalism and development discourse.  They have also painted a 
rather bleak picture of the contemporary situation in the Aguán – one that is dominated 
by violence, injustice, and political economic forces that appear so powerful as to limit 
the ability of individuals to exercise agency on the ground. 
 But this is not the whole story.  For each account of exploitation and repression 
there is a parallel story of resistance.  For every force that seems to act on the campesinos 
of the Aguán, there is a counter-force that stems from them.  In this chapter, I focus on 
the grassroots response to this conflict and the repressive context in which it occurs.  I 
consider how the campesino movements of the Aguán frame and articulate their 
struggles, the significance of alliances and networks in these processes, and the ways in 
which the movements are constantly negotiating the volatile political environment in 
which they operate.  I also examine the ways in which these movements make various 
types of claims on the state: demanding their human and subsistence rights, calling for an 
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end to the repression they experience, and asserting themselves as legitimate participants 
in the policy realm.   
 It is important here to recognize the diversity that exists among the campesino 
movements of the Aguán.  For this reason I use the plural movements rather than the 
singular – to account for the fact that while there are many commonalities between 
movement organizations in terms of experience and identity, there is not complete 
homogeneity.  There are roughly twenty distinct campesino movement organizations in 
the Aguán, and while they often collaborate and share positions on many issues, there is 
also divergence on others.  These movement organizations are further comprised of 
campesino families from dozens of agricultural cooperatives, each with its own 
experience with the processes of agrarian reform and counter-reform, interactions with 
landowners and the state, and analyses regarding the problems their communities face.  
The information presented here thus cannot fully capture the diversity present among 
these movements; rather, it reflects what I perceive as the dominant discourse present in 
the region.  The majority of the data informing my analysis originates from the 
movement organization MUCA (the Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguán, or 
Movimiento Unificado Campesino del Aguán), as they tend to maintain the highest public 
profile and produce the greatest amount of material.  I also draw, to a lesser degree, from 
materials produced by MCA (the Campesino Movement of the Aguán, or Movimiento 
Campesino del Aguán), and MOCSAM (the Campesino Movement of San Manuel 
Cortés, or Movimiento Campesino de San Manuel Cortés), as these are also relatively 
high-profile organizations.  Of particular importance are several comunicados which 
these and other movement organizations issued jointly, in cooperation with regional and 
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national campesino unions. These documents thus reflect shared positions on the conflict 
in the Aguán and other related issues, as expressed to the wider public.   
 To begin this analysis, I briefly revisit relevant social movement theory, 
considering the ways in which the political process model, in particular, can help us 
better comprehend the complex dynamics of contentious politics in the Aguán.  I then 
follow the three primary veins of social movement theory as a means to organize my 
discussion of popular mobilization in the Aguán, demonstrating the relevance of each and 
thereby supporting McAdam’s (1999) position that an effective model must integrate 
these approaches.  In these sections, I analyze movement-produced materials35 
(comunicados, videos, statements to the press) to illustrate the movements’ framing 
processes, their strategies and tactics, and the ways in which they mobilize and leverage 
pressure to create social change.  Through an analysis of this public discourse produced 
by the movements and their allies, I seek to make evident the diversity of approaches 
these sophisticated movements utilize in their struggles.  My aim here is not to provide an 
exhaustive account of the nature of these movements or the conflict in the Aguán.  
Instead, this chapter has two primary goals:  first, to document (however incompletely) 
the struggles of these important movements, and second, to contribute to our 
understandings of how social movements function within the context of a highly 
repressive state in today’s globalized world.   
                                                 
35 All the translations in this chapter are mine.  I include the original Spanish in footnotes as a means to 
preserve the integrity of the original statements made by movement participants and their allies. 
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Understanding the Movements via Political Process 
 As discussed in Chapter II, there are many different approaches to the study of 
social movements.  Each tradition of theory tends to emphasize different components of 
movement formation and activity – namely, culturalist, structuralist, and materialist – and 
each can ultimately be critiqued as doing so at the expense of other factors.  My 
approach, which is largely informed by Doug McAdam’s (1999) revised political process 
model, seeks to integrate these various strains of theory into a more historically-informed 
and dynamic view of contentious politics in the Aguán.  
 The insights gained from McAdam’s work are significant.  His model encourages 
us to consider the impacts of the various political, social, and cultural processes at play, 
both those internal and external to the movement.  It provides a framework through 
which to account for the ways these processes interact and constantly change and evolve.  
It further acknowledges the relevance of structural opportunities and constraints as well 
as the importance of organizational networks, while avoiding being overly deterministic 
by leaving space for individual and collective agency.  In short, it provides a holistic and 
dynamic model with which we can craft an analysis that is conscious of the ways in 
which a given context and movement interact with and shape one another. 
 In the following sections, I organize the themes that emerged during my analysis 
of the public discourse of campesino movements in the Aguán around three theoretical 
constructs:  framing processes, assessment of political opportunities and threats, and 
mobilization of structures and resources.  These represent the primary veins of traditional 
social movement theory (culturalist, structuralist, and materialist, respectively).  Though I 
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present these as nominally distinct areas for the sake of making clear analytical 
demonstrations, the degree to which they are interrelated and interdependent should, by 
now, be clear.   
Framing Processes 
 Certain traditions of social movement theory pay particular attention to the 
importance of identity, beliefs, and values among movement members.  The extent to 
which these phenomena are shared has important implications for movements’ abilities to 
coalesce and thrive.  However, it is not merely the “shared meanings” or “cultural 
understandings” (McAdam 1999, ix) themselves that are important here, but also the 
ways in which they contribute to a group’s understanding of their social and/or political 
problems, and consequently, of the particular actors or processes that may be deemed as 
responsible for those problems. McAdam refers to these as “interpretive processes” and 
“collective attribution,” and argues that they are significant for their ability to “require 
participants to reject institutionalized routines and taken for granted assumptions about 
the world and to fashion new world views and lines of interaction” (1999, xxi).  Taken 
together (and following McAdam), these constitute what I refer to here as “framing 
processes.”   
 The campesino movements of the Aguán frame their struggle in multiple ways.  
These frames have emerged from the movements’ analyses of historical relationships, 
contemporary politics, and material conditions in the region.  The movements often 
invoke rights-based discourses and notions of social justice in relation to the problems of 
landlessness, poverty, and political violence they face.  They also draw on a strong 
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collective identity as campesinos, emphasizing the centrality of land to their way of life.  
They make clear that the material conditions in which they live are direct results of 
national policy and global political economic processes, as well as the privileging of the 
interests of the elite class in Honduras.  While they are unambiguous in deeming the state 
and the elite responsible for creating the current conflict, they also present themselves not 
as helpless victims, but rather as active agents of change who deserve a say in their own 
destiny. 
Rights, Justice, and Food Sovereignty 
 Among the most important concepts around which the movements frame their 
struggle and organize their constituents are notions of rights, justice, and food 
sovereignty.  The emphasis on human rights is clear and consistent.  The movements 
denounce the violations of their human rights on multiple levels – primarily, the denial of 
their right to access the land needed to sustain themselves, and their right to live free of 
political persecution and continuous violence.  As Yoni Rivas, the General Secretary of 
MUCA, argues, “we are reclaiming our right which is a human right; access to land, it is 
a human right and it is incumbent upon us because we are poor and we need the land”36  
(Emanuelsson).  This statement also gives us insight into the ways these concepts often 
intersect and overlap, as, for example, access to land is viewed simultaneously as a 
human right, an issue of social justice, and a necessity for the attainment of food 
sovereignty.   
                                                 
36 “estamos reclamando un derecho nuestro que es un derecho humano; el acceso a la tierra, es un 
derecho humano y nos compete porque somos pobres y necesitamos la tierra” 
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 Food sovereignty has become a central issue around which the movements 
organize and assert their rights in the Aguán.  They frequently refer to the “agrarian and 
food crisis”37 that Honduras currently faces.  The movements’ efforts in this realm were 
acknowledged when MUCA was recognized for the US Food Sovereignty Alliance’s 
2012 Food Sovereignty Prize.   In a videotaped acceptance speech for this honor, Yoni 
Rivas thanks the organization, which he says “has supported, really our efforts, our 
sacrifices to contribute to this society, so that we can achieve genuine food security”38 
(“2012”).  He describes locally-based agricultural projects in which their communities are 
engaged, noting that “through these products we are ensuring food sovereignty.”39 He 
also laments the deaths of community members “who have been assassinated due to the 
fight for power and to have our own food.”40   This message is visually conveyed by a 
poster that documents the community projects that Yoni speaks of.  It appears in several 
photographs posted to MUCA’s Facebook page on July 3, 2013, and reads:   “We the 
campesinos of MUCA struggle for a true food sovereignty,”41 and “These projects have 
been developed in an environment of criminalization and persecution against MUCA.”42  
                                                 
37 “crisis agraria y alimentaria” 
 
38 “han valorado pues realmente nuestros esfuerzos, nuestros sacrificios por aportar a esta sociedad para 
poder alcanzar una verdadera soberanía alimentaria” 
 
39 “a través de esta producción estamos garantizando la soberanía alimentaria” 
 
40 “que han sido asesinado por la lucha a poder y tener nuestro alimento”  
 
41 “Los campesinos de MUCA luchamos por una verdadera soberanía alimentaria” 
 
42 “Estos proyectos se han desarrollado en un entorno de criminalización y persecución en contra de 
MUCA” 
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The issue of food sovereignty is especially emphasized by the Plataforma Agraria, of 
which Vía Campesina, the group from which the concept originates,43 is a member.   
 The horrible irony that rural poverty and food insecurity remain critical issues in 
the most productive agricultural region in Honduras is not lost on the campesino 
movements of the Aguán, and the connection between access to land and survival is 
direct.  As a leader of MUCA, quoted by Gustavo Irías, remarked, “‘For us the land is a 
key element, if we cultivate the land we have basic grains and vegetables….The land is 
essential for life”44 (n.d.,18). Juan Chinchilla, another leader of MUCA, reminds us of the 
movements’ central concern regarding food and hunger in this struggle: “[for] us the war 
is not against the government, against the police, against the army…our war is against 
hunger”45  (Emanuelsson).  In the same interview, Yoni Rivas makes clear that their 
desire for land is directly related to food security and food sovereignty, and not for 
pursuit of commercial gain through mass production of African palm: “The Unified 
Campesino Movement of the Aguán is not much interested in the plantation.  Our interest 
is in recuperating the land.  Let us not forget that in the ‘80s Honduras was the 
breadbasket of Central America and our movement is interested in enabling us to produce 
what we consume daily in our houses, in our homes”46   (Emanuelsson).  
                                                 
43 For more on Vía Campesina and the concept of food sovereignty, see Claeys (n.d.), and Desmarais and 
Nicholson (n.d.). 
 
44 “Para nostras la tierra es un elemento fundamental, si cultivamos la tierra tenemos granos básicos y 
hortalizas…La tierra es fundamental para la vida” 
 
45 “[Para] nosotros la guerra no es contra el gobierno, contra la policía, contra el ejército…entonces, la 
guerra de nosotros es en contra el hambre” 
 
46 “El Movimiento Unificado Campesino del Aguán no tiene tanto así el interés en la plantación.  Nuestro 
interés es en recuperar la tierra.  No olvidemos que en los años 80, Honduras eramos granero de 
87 
 
 Taken together, these statements from movement spokespeople convey the multi-
dimensional and overlapping ways in which these individuals and groups understand the 
situation of campesinos in the Aguán today.  While on one level they are fighting for 
land, the movements are very conscious of the fact that this struggle is tied up in that of 
several others – struggles for social justice, self-determination, food sovereignty, and the 
protection of human rights.  They are also mindful of the fact that their current struggle 
has deep historical roots, as does popular resistance in the region. 
Identity and the Legacy of Organized Labor 
 The strong collective campesino identity that exists in the Aguán is another 
crucial piece of the movements’ framing processes.  Scholars trace this to the history of 
agrarian reform and the collective production processes it inspired, as well as to the 
legacy of banana workers in the region.47   Settling lands granted through agrarian reform 
was no easy task, and as Kerssen notes, “peasants who benefitted from these reforms 
nonetheless had to fight to improve living conditions and gain greater control over the 
value of their labor” (2013, 16).  This struggle thus instilled a collective identity that is 
inextricably connected to the land – an identity that is embodied in the motto of MUCA:  
“We are not fish that live in the water, nor birds that live in the air; we are men and 
women who live from the land.”48  The sense of collectivity is further reflected in the 
words of Adolfo Castañeda of MUCA, who when speaking about what is at stake in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
Centroamérica y nuestro movimiento está interesado en hacer producir lo que consumimos diariamente en 
nuestras casas, en nuestros hogares.” 
 
47 See, for example, Kerssen (2013), Brockett (1998). 
 
48 “No somos peces para vivir del agua, ni aves para vivir del aire; somos hombres y mujeres para vivir de 
la tierra” 
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current struggle said, “If we are going to win, we all win, and if we are going to lose, we 
all lose”49 (“Movimiento”).  These statements demonstrate the interconnectivity of the 
campesino identity and the land, and help us understand why these individuals are willing 
to risk their lives in this collective struggle.  
 The legacy of organized labor among banana workers and other agricultural 
workers is also important here.  Kerssen cites the struggles of banana workers against 
U.S.-based United Fruit and Standard Fruit companies, which culminated in the 1954 
general strike – an event she aptly describes as a “watershed moment in Honduran social 
history” (2013, 16).  Following the strike, the fruit companies terminated half of their 
labor force, a move that “only augmented the mass of people clamoring for land, creating 
a powerful movement of peasants and landless workers that the government was forced 
to reckon with” (Kerssen 2013, 16).  Charles Brockett also notes the importance of the 
struggles of the banana workers, and argues that these led to the beginnings of “serious 
peasant mobilization in Honduras” (1998, 187). This history of resistance is still 
celebrated today, and continues to inspire individuals in the Aguán and beyond. 
 While the current campesino organizations are relatively young, the history of 
formal organization among Honduran campesinos undoubtedly contributes to their 
strength.50  Many national campesino unions and federations date to the early 1960s, and 
Brockett argues that by the end of the decade “Honduran peasants had organized and 
were asserting themselves to a degree unparalleled in Central America and perhaps even 
                                                 
49 “Si vamos a ganar, vamos a ganar todos, y si vamos a perder, vamos a perder todos” 
 
50 For a much more detailed discussion of the history of campesino organizations in Honduras, see Euraque 
(1996) and Brockett (1998). 
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in all of Latin America” (1998, 189).  For example, the CCUC (the Comité Central de 
Unificación Campesina or Central Committee of Campesino Unity), which later became 
FENACH, formed in 1961.  The following year, they began a series of land occupations 
and organized a march of 1,000 campesinos to the town of El Progresso – the largest 
public demonstration of campesinos that had been held to that time in Honduras 
(Brockett 1998, 187-8).  ANACH (The Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de 
Honduras, or National Association of Honduran Campesinos), FECORAH (the 
Federación de Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria Honduras, or Federation of 
Honduran Agrarian Reform Cooperatives), and UNC (Unión Nacional de Campesinos, or 
National Campesino Union) all formed during this time and are still active today.  Also 
important is the “radio school movement” of the 1960s, which was an effort of the 
Catholic Church that as it developed “undertook more directly the successive 
commitments of peasant mobilization, organization, and support of confrontation with 
elite interests” (Brockett 1998, 189).  Contemporary movements are able to draw on these 
strong legacies of organization and collective struggle to mobilize individuals and 
communities around the issues they face today.  
Framing the Class Dimensions of the Conflict 
 The movements and their spokespeople often emphasize the extent to which the 
interests and concerns of campesinos and elite landowners are inherently distinct and 
very often at odds.  We can conceptualize this as the conflicting interests of the capitalist 
class and the popular classes, or as the contradictions that emerge between the process of 
capital accumulation and the practice of subsistence-oriented agriculture.  This difference 
is made particularly clear in the following comments made by Esly Banegas, coordinator 
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of the Committee of Popular Organizations of the Aguán (Coordinadora de 
Organizaciones Populares del Aguán, or COPA):   
 nd this resource of land, then, the landlord, the rancher is in the permanent 
 search for this resource because that is where his wealth lies.  And the campesino 
 because he has never had it and because it is a right, in this case as a Honduran.  
 So the contradiction is permanent.  The fight for this resource is permanent – 
 one to survive and for the right to feed one’s self, and the other to make himself 
 rich.51   (“Lucha”)   
Similarly, Juan Chinchilla of MUCA addresses the class divide:  “What we are looking 
for is a way out of poverty.  They [the elite], in nice cars, take the money to other 
countries, they don’t leave it here.  And we are the ones who suffer the consequences.  
Here we don’t have medicine, doctors – we have absolutely nothing – education, all of 
that”52 (Emanuelsson).  In a region where rural poverty is extreme and class divisions are 
especially apparent, these disparities become glaringly obvious. 
Attributing Responsibility to Landowners and the State 
 While there is then a clear distinction between the classes, this alone is not 
enough to explain the violent conflict currently plaguing the Aguán.  The process of 
capital accumulation is central to the equation, but the elite only achieved this degree of 
concentration of land and resources because the state was on their side – facilitating 
policy that favors their interests and sponsoring or sanctioning violence to suppress 
challenges to their power.  As Rudy Hernández of MUCA indicates in the following 
                                                 
51 “Y este recurso tierra, entonces, el terrateniente, el ganadero está en la buscada permanente este 
recurso porque allí está su riqueza.  Y el campesino porque nunca la ha tenido y porque es un derecho en 
este caso como hondureño y hondureña.  Entonces la contradicción es permanente.  La lucha por este 
recurso es permanente – uno para sobrevivir y por el derecho a alimentarse y el otro por enriquecerse.” 
 
52 “Lo que nosotros vamos buscando es salir de la pobreza.  Ellos en buenos carros, llevan el dinero para 
otros países, no lo dejan aquí.  Y nosotros somos los que sufrimos las consecuencias.  Nosotros aquí no 
tenemos medicación, médicos, o sea no tenemos absolutamente nada, educación, todo eso.”   
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statement, the landowners have achieved a tremendous level of influence in the Honduran 
government, to the point where they are essentially calling the shots: 
 The men against whom we are now fighting in the Aguán Valley are those who 
 for years have kept the Honduran society under the yoke and suffering, in 
 poverty.  These are the men who generate poverty and wealth for themselves.  
 They are those who manipulate information, they are those who tell governments 
 what to do and not do.  It is they who install and remove governments.  These 
 same men right now in the department of Colon…they have concentrated all the 
 land, they have thousands of hectares.  These men not only have the land that we 
 are fighting for, elsewhere in the same department they have thousands of 
 hectares, they fenced them off so no one can enter.  The struggle that we are 
 waging in the Lower Aguán Valley is a very difficult struggle, it is practically a 
 fight against the Honduran oligarchy, against the Honduran state, because instead 
 of looking for solutions what they do is sharpen the conflict over this issue.53 
 (Emanuelsson) 
This statement also reflects the sentiment that the elite and the state are not making 
efforts to actually end this conflict – rather, they continue to protect their own political 
and economic interests and in turn feed the conflict, which leads to hugely 
disproportionate losses to the campesinos. 
Direct Implication of the LMDSA and Neoliberal Model 
 The movements of the Aguán are explicit in their condemnation of the LMDSA, 
and they identify this policy as a primary cause of the current conflict.  Many 
comunicados contain strongly-worded language to this effect.  For example, one such 
                                                 
53 “Los señores contra quienes luchamos nosotros ahora en el Valle del Aguán son los señores que por 
años han mantenido a la sociedad hondureña bajo el yugo y bajo el sufrimiento, bajo la pobreza.  Estos 
señores son los que generan pobreza y riqueza para ellos.  Estos señores son los que manipulan la 
información, son los que ellos dicen que hacer y no hacer a los gobiernos. Son ellos los que ponen y quitan 
gobiernos. Estos señores ahora mismo tienen en el departamento de Colon…este…tienen este concentrada 
toda la tierra, tienen miles de hectáreas. Estos señores no solo son de las tierras que estamos peleando 
nosotros, en otras zonas del mismo departamento tienen miles de hectáreas, las tienen cercadas para que 
nadie pueda ingresar. Entonces la lucha que nosotros ahora libramos en Valle de Bajo Aguán es un lucha 
muy difícil, es una lucha prácticamente contra la oligarquía hondureña, contra el mismo estado 
hondureño, porque esto en vez de buscar soluciones, lo que hacen es agudizar más este, el conflicto más la 
problemática” 
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document issued by MUCA on February 5, 2014 states: “We clarify that the agrarian and 
food crisis that our country lives in was generated in 1992 in the government of Rafael 
Leonado Callejas with the approval of the fateful and unconstitutional Law of 
Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector.”54  Another comunicado 
dated May 15, 2013 uses nearly identical phrasing,55 and the expression “fateful and 
unconstitutional” (“fatídica e inconstitucional”) is frequently used in reference to the law.  
This position is further articulated in the first demand of a comunicado issued by several 
movement organizations and campesino unions, dated August 8, 2012: 
 We demand the immediate repeal of the “Law of Modernization and 
 Development of the Agricultural Sector,” that which we the campesino  
 organizations have declared unconstitutional, as it is contradictory to what the 
 article 344 of the Constitution of the Republic provides, and that which to present 
 has only left us hundreds of dead, injured, and thousands of defendants in courts, 
 and misery and poverty in the rural areas of the country.56 (“Posicionamiento 
 Campesino”) 
 
   One of the most powerful condemnations of the LMDSA and of specific landlords 
and state actors is a MUCA-produced poster (see Appendix) often present at press 
                                                 
54 “Aclaramos que la crisis agraria y alimentaria que vive nuestros país, fue generada en 1992 en el 
gobierno de Rafael Leonado Callejas con la aprobación de la fatídica e inconstitucional Ley de 
Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola.” 
 
55“We clarify that the agrarian and food crisis that our country lives in was generated in 1992 in the 
government of ex-President Rafael Leonado Callejas, who approved the fateful and unconstitutional Law 
of Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector.”  Original Spanish:  “Aclaramos que la 
crisis agraria y alimentaria que vive nuestros país fue generada en 1992 en el gobierno del ex presidente 
Rafael Leonardo Callejas quien aprobó la fatídica e inconstitucional Ley de Modernización y Desarrollo 
del Sector Agrícola.” 
 
56 “Exigimos la derogación inmediata de La “Ley de Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola” la 
cual las organizaciones campesinas la hemos declarado inconstitucional, ya que es contradictorio con lo 
que contempla el artículo 344 de la Constitución de la Republica y que hasta hoy solo nos ha dejados 
centenares de muertos, heridos y miles de procesados en los Tribunales y miseria y pobreza en las zonas 
rurales del país.” 
 
93 
 
conferences and other public events.  It is made from a large piece of poster board, and 
across the top reads “Consequences of the Law of Agricultural Modernization.”57  Below 
this are a dozen very graphic photos of the bodies of individuals who have been 
assassinated in the struggle, including Ignacio Reyes, Teodoro Acosta, Israel Garcia, 
Matias Valle, Ivan Jose Peralta, Victor Maya, and others who are not named or whose 
names cannot be read in photos of the poster.  In the center of the poster are the words 
“Responsible Groups,”58 with images of five men underneath:  Miguel Facussé, Juan 
Ramón Martinez, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, Rodolfo Irias Navas, and Jaime Rosenthal.  
Miguel Facussé and Jaime Rosenthal are two of the richest men in Honduras, large 
landowners in the Aguán and elsewhere in Honduras, and were primary supporters of the 
2009 coup.  Juan Ramón Martinez, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, and Rodolfo Irias Navas 
held the positions of director of the National Agrarian Institute (INA), President of the 
Republic, and president of the National Congress, respectively, at the time the LMDSA 
was approved in 1992.  Below these photos are eight others that document the 
militarization of the Aguán – showing dozens of heavily armed soldiers, police dressed in 
riot gear, and private security guards.  The visual impact of this poster is undeniable, and 
its message is tremendously clear.   
 A visit to MUCA’s website59 further elucidates their position on this issue.  The 
text at the top of the main page reads:  
                                                 
57 “Consecuencias de ‘La Ley de Modernización Agrícola’” 
 
58 “Grupos Responsables” 
 
59 http://movimientomuca.blogspot.com/ 
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 In the early ‘90s, during the administration of Rafael Leonardo Callejas, the Law 
 for the Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector was passed in 
 Honduras, and with it a plan was carried out to expropriate the campesino firms of 
 the rights that the state assigned them in the ‘70s over thousands of hectares 
 planted in African palm (Elaeis guinensis) in the region known as the Bajo Aguan 
 in the northern department of the Atlantic coast of Honduras.  The law in question 
 became the political strategy of state officials in partnership with greedy 
 businessmen to make themselves owners of 20 thousand hectares of the best land 
 in the country (around 28 thousand manzanas or 48 thousand acres).60   
This statement reflects MUCA’s analysis of what I have previously referred to as the 
political project of neoliberalism.  While the LMDSA was supposedly a means to 
“modernize” agricultural production in the Aguán and to address landlessness via the 
market, MUCA more accurately recognizes the policy as a tool that would allow the elite 
to grab campesinos’ land and thus to consolidate their economic and political power in 
the region.  MUCA further recognizes the collusion between the state and the elite in this 
process, and the extent to which public policy is essentially hijacked to meet these ends.  
In this sense, the LMDSA is one example of many where elite interests are furthered via 
the actions of the state. 
 The movements’ frames extend beyond the local context and the immediate needs 
of the campesinos, as they connect their local reality to larger political economic issues.  
The involvement and culpability of the United States, World Bank, and other 
international institutions are frequently cited, as the threats facing the Aguán are located 
                                                 
60 “A principios de la década de los 90, en la administración de Rafael Leonardo Callejas, se aprueba en 
Honduras la Ley para la Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola, y con ella se instrumentaliza un 
plan para expropiar a las empresas campesinas de los derechos que el Estado les asignara a mediados de 
la década de los 70 sobre miles de hectáreas cultivadas con palma africana (Elaeis guinensis) en la región 
conocida como el Bajo Aguan en el departamento norteño de la costa atlántica de Honduras. La ley en 
mención se convirtió en la estrategia política de funcionarios estatales en sociedad con empresarios 
codiciosos para convertirse en propietarios de 20 mil hectáreas de las mejores tierras del país (alrededor 
de 28 mil manzanas o 48 mil acres).” 
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within a global context.  A September 13, 2012 comunicado issued jointly by several 
movement organizations and their allies states: “We declare ourselves in a permanent 
state of alert in defense of our agricultural food rights and national sovereignty”61 
(“Posicionamiento de Organizaciones”).   For Vitalino Alvarez of MUCA, the fight 
extends far beyond the fields of the Aguán; as he states, “we represent a movement in 
struggle to challenge the savage capitalist system”62  (“Movimiento”).  
Proposing Solutions 
 As part of the processes of framing and attribution of the problems facing the 
Aguán, the movements also present solutions.  Primarily, they demand the immediate 
repeal of the LMDSA and the implementation of new agrarian reform, along with the end 
to the violence against and criminalization of campesino movements.  Nearly all 
comunicados articulate these same demands.  The movements have taken concrete action 
to achieve these goals, and have actually designed a new agrarian reform policy.  The 
movements and their allies presented the Ley de Transformación Agraria Integral (Law 
of Integral Agrarian Transformation, or LTAI) to the National Congress of Honduras on 
October 11, 2011.  This proposed policy reflects the movements’ call to address the 
structural causes of the conflict and social inequality.  The proposal is very progressive in 
nature, and actually addresses the limitations of previous agrarian reform programs, 
which the LMDSA largely failed to do.  I will return to a discussion of the Ley de 
Transformación Agraria Integral in the concluding chapter. 
                                                 
61 “Nos declaramos en estado de alerta permanente en defensa de nuestros derechos alimentarios agrarios 
y soberanía nacional” 
 
62 “representamos un movimiento en lucha para desafiar al sistema capitalista salvaje” 
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 The desire to enact a program of agrarian reform that takes issues of social justice 
seriously is a central focus of the campesino movements of the Aguán.  A statement by 
Rudy Hernández of MUCA particularly embodies the passion of the movements’ claims 
in this area: “We repeat:  we demand of Pepe Lobo and his cabinet to repeal the Law of 
Agricultural Modernization, because that law does much harm and thus the changes, as 
[Yoni] also said:  change now!  We want Agrarian Reform now!”63 (Emanuelsson).  
While the urgency of this demand is not well relayed in the written English translation, it 
bears inclusion here, as this is an underlying and ever-present demand, along with an end 
to the repression and violence against the movements.   
 The movements have also taken steps toward participating in institutional politics 
more directly, while not abandoning their efforts at the grassroots level.  In 2011, the 
FNRP formed an official political party, Libre (Partido Libertad y Refundación, or Party 
of Liberty and Refoundation), which many – though certainly not all – of the movement 
organizations and their members are affiliated with.  In the highly contested November 
2013 elections, multiple members of the campesino movements ran for and were elected 
to National Congress seats and local mayorships under the Libre banner.  For example, 
Rafael Alegría, a long time campesino leader and coordinator of La Vía Campesina in 
Honduras, and Wilfredo Paz, spokesperson of the Permanent Observatory of Human 
Rights in the Aguán, were elected as congressmen (diputados) for the departments of 
Francisco Morazán and Colón, respectively.  Many other allies of the movement won 
positions in these elections, and Libre’s strong showing overall helped create a political 
                                                 
63 “Nosotros repetimos: le exigimos a Pepe Lobo y a su gabinete que derogue esa Ley de Modernización 
Agrícola, porque esa ley hace mucho daño y de esa forma los cambios como él [Yoni] lo dijo también:  
¡Cambio ya!  ¡Queremos Reforma Agraria ya!” 
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climate that is at least marginally better for the movements in most cases, though it was 
far from an all-out victory.64 
 The movements’ ability to propose solutions that might realistically be enacted is 
obviously limited by power structures in the realms of national and local-level politics.  
This again draws attention to the importance of context, and makes clear that the 
movements themselves do not have complete control over their own destiny.  They are 
working within a system dominated by particular vested interests and entrenched class 
structures, and access to that system is largely closed to many sectors of society.  This 
reminds us that regardless of the strength of the movements’ collective identity, the 
sophistication of their analysis, and their ability to create a narrative that resonates with 
individuals and inspires them to act, there are other factors that impact movements’ 
success in significant and unavoidable ways. 
Political Opportunities and Threats 
 While these various processes of sense-making and interpretation among 
movement members are clearly of great importance, external factors also impact 
movements’ abilities to thrive.  We cannot think of movements as phenomena that occur 
devoid of time and space.  Considering the nature of the context in which movements 
operate, the actions of the state and groups that oppose a given movement, and the ways 
in which power is entrenched in a society are also key.  Further, we must recognize that 
these factors are constantly changing, and that this has important implications for 
                                                 
64 Again, the elections of November 2013 were highly contested and wrought with fraud, and the outcome 
is complicated.  I reflect on these issues briefly in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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movements.   As McAdam notes, “the particular set of power relations that define the 
political environment at any point in time hardly constitutes an immutable structure of 
political life.  Instead, the opportunities for a challenger to engage in successful collective 
action are expected to vary over time.  It is these variations that are held to shape the ebb 
and flow of movement activity” (1999, ix).   
 Recognizing the changing nature of a given context allows us to view social 
movements as constantly evolving phenomena, and to understand contentious politics as 
a dynamic process.  Many theorists have focused on the ways that changing context, 
responses to movement activity by the opposition, and other external factors impact 
movements.  These result in both the creation of political space in which a movement can 
more successfully stake claims or garner public support, and conversely, of threats that 
close that space and jeopardize the success of the movement.  McAdam recognizes that 
“any broad social change process that significantly undermines the calculations and 
assumptions on which the political establishment is structured is very likely to cause a 
significant expansion in political opportunity for single or multiple challengers” (1999, 
ix, original emphasis).  At times a particular event, cultural shift, or some other change 
can represent both a political opportunity and a threat. 
The 2009 Coup 
 The 2009 coup d’état that deposed President Manuel Zelaya was clearly one of 
the most important events in recent history in Honduras, and has tremendous implications 
for the campesino movements of the Aguán and all other social movements in the nation.  
To say that the events of June 28, 2009 changed everything is not to be hyperbolic. 
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Though at the time it was impossible to predict the specific ramifications of those events, 
in retrospect we can not only assess the ways in which the coup created political threats 
to the campesino movements, but also identify potential opportunities that were born that 
day. 
 The ways in which the coup represents a political threat to the movements in the 
Aguán are rather clear.  It resulted in the expulsion of a president who was relatively 
sympathetic to the situation of campesinos and their needs, despite the fact that he 
himself is a member of the landed elite of the nation.  As previously discussed, Zelaya 
had been working with the movements in the Aguán, and during his administration much 
progress was made toward resolving a number of land conflicts.  He had signed Decree 
18-2008, which was to have granted 20,000 families in the Aguán title to their land.  The 
coup preempted this from becoming a reality, however, as he was removed from office 
just days before the policy would have gone into effect.  There is little doubt that 
Zelaya’s movement toward redistributing land to campesinos in the Aguán was a major 
factor in his ouster, nor was this the first time that a Honduran president was removed 
from office for daring to implement land reform.65  We can thus view the years of the 
Zelaya administration as having constituted a political opportunity for the movements. 
 The coup itself, then, and the post-coup regimes that have followed represented a 
swift closing of that political space and the appearance of a serious threat to the 
movements.  The coup and the widespread repression that has followed sent a clear and 
unmistakable signal of this shift.  This political threat manifested in an increasingly 
                                                 
65 President Ramón Villeda Morales was ousted in a military coup on October 3, 1963, the year after 
instituting the original Agrarian Reform Law. 
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violent and repressive context and a string of regimes that are openly hostile to 
campesinos’ concerns and quite plainly work to protect the interests of capital and the 
elite class. 
 However, I argue that we can also view the coup as having created political 
opportunities.  As previously discussed, the FNRP emerged in the wake of the coup, and 
has grown and become immeasurably stronger in spite of much repression.  This can be 
viewed as an opportunity in various ways.  For example, it has led to new and stronger 
alliances between social movements, including the campesino movements and other 
sectors of the Resistance.  It has also resulted in increased public awareness of many 
social issues and a deepened political consciousness in much of the society.  Members of 
the Resistance often talk about the coup as an “awakening” for the people of Honduras, 
thus demonstrating their view of this as an opportunity of sorts.  Many people have told 
me that they were not politically active prior to the coup, but that the crisis their society 
has since faced forced them to “wake up” to a wide range of issues and to take a stance 
on them.  It is fair to say that a new generation of activists was born that day.  
Criminalization of the Movements 
 The criminalization of resistance has been a reality across many sectors in 
Honduras since the coup.  This materializes in various ways, most visibly in campaigns 
of misinformation and defamation in the media and public spaces, and the use of the legal 
system to bring illegitimate charges against activists.  These actions pose a serious threat 
to the movements, as they not only impact public discourse in a way that can be 
counterproductive to the efforts of the movements, but can also have a demobilizing 
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effect on group dynamics and place additional burdens on individuals, potentially 
preventing them from becoming active in the struggle. 
 The diffusion of misinformation campaigns in the elite-controlled media is a 
common tactic used by those who wish to discredit the campesino movements and other 
sectors of the Resistance in Honduras.  It is common to read blatant lies and distorted 
representations of the truths of the conflict in the Aguán in the newspapers and to hear 
them on television and radio.  For example, these stories often report claims that the 
movements are heavily armed and forming guerrilla groups, that foreign agitators are 
infiltrating the area, and so forth.  Gilberto Ríos argues that through these campaigns the 
media has essentially “reinvented the productive history of the valley in favor of the 
landlords”66 (2010, 1).  The impact of these campaigns cannot be underestimated.  These 
are particularly dangerous within Honduras, where people in other parts of the country 
read or hear about the supposed danger the movements pose, and form opinions about 
them based on this misinformation.  This can limit the local and regional support that the 
movements might otherwise enjoy.  Repercussions might include lessened public support 
for policy that would benefit movements, such as agrarian reform, and conversely, 
support for the ongoing militarization of the region.  These campaigns ultimately obscure 
the motives of the state and elite and unjustly present the movements as dangerous 
criminals as opposed to nonviolent campesinos seeking basic rights and improved 
material conditions. 
                                                 
66 “reinventado la historia productiva del valle a favor de los terratenientes” 
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 In addition to the promotion of false information in public discourse, the use of 
the legal system to unjustly accuse movement members and their allies of crimes has 
become widespread.  Indeed, while killings in the Aguán nearly always go unpunished, 
the state has investigated a great deal of energy into processing members of the 
campesino organizations for alleged crimes such as usurpation and disturbing the peace, a 
point recognized by the 2014 Human Rights Watch report.  This represents another major 
demobilization strategy on the state’s end, and a clear threat to the movements.  In 
addition to placing financial strain on individuals, requiring their time to attend legal 
proceedings and to report regularly to sign court registers, and contributing to the unjust 
perception of the movements as criminal, it also serves to diminish the ability of social 
movements to gain a footing in institutional politics.  In Honduras, anyone facing 
criminal charges is prevented from voting.  In the highly contested 2013 elections, more 
than 3,000 Honduran campesinos were prevented from voting due to pending criminal 
charges specifically related to their participation in the Resistance (AfGJ and TFA 2013, 
6).  When visiting communities in the lead-up to the election, I heard time and time again 
that this technicality was preventing large numbers of Libre supporters, including many 
members of campesino movements, from voting. 
 A particularly emblematic example here is that of Jose Isabel Morales, better 
known as “Chavelo.”67  I had the opportunity to meet Chavelo during our 2013 elections 
delegation, and to hear his testimony.  At that time, Chavelo had been imprisoned for 
more than five years, accused of the killing of Manrique Osorto, the nephew of powerful 
                                                 
67 Also often spelled “Chabelo.” 
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landlord (and now head of the police force in the department of Olancho) Henry Osorto.68  
Chavelo insists that he did not commit this crime, and there is no evidence indicating his 
guilt.  In 2010, he was sentenced to serve 20 years in prison for the alleged offense, but 
the sentence had recently been overturned by the Supreme Court when I met him in 
November, 2013.  At that time, Chavelo was to have already been released pending a new 
trial the following January, but supposed issues with paperwork were causing his release 
to be delayed.  Chavelo was ultimately never released, despite the orders from the 
Supreme Court to do so.  In February 2014 he was again convicted of murder and 
sentenced to 17 and a half years, not including time already served.  In addition to a 
complete lack of evidence in the crime, observers at the trial reported glaring 
inconsistencies in the testimony of state witnesses, who often directly contradicted 
testimony they had given at the first trial.  His conviction was nearly solely based on the 
testimony of Henry Osorto, which was tremendously inflammatory and details of which 
were quite obviously fabricated.  Chavelo’s case represents one of the most egregious 
violations of justice in Honduras.  It may, however, also be seen as having provided a 
tragic point around which the movements and their allies are able to garner support both 
nationally and internationally. 
Repression as Both a Threat and an Opportunity 
 We can thus ultimately view the high levels of political violence, criminalization 
of the campesino movements, and increasing marginalization of the movements from the 
political sphere as both a political threat and an opportunity.  The degree to which these 
                                                 
68 For a detailed account of the events leading to the imprisonment of Chavelo and his subsequent trials, see 
McCain (2013a and 2013b). 
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phenomena constitute a threat is very apparent. They drain the movement’s resources and 
individuals’ energy, may instill fear or resignation in some, and threaten to demobilize 
the movements that so many have fought so hard to form.  However, these same 
strategies of the state may lead to the opposite effect, and may actually serve to 
consolidate the very movements they seek to destroy.   
 As Tanya Kerssen argues, “In post-coup Honduras…the Lobo government’s 
ruthless repression has paradoxically served as an unassailable point of unity – in the 
Aguán and beyond” (2013, 103).  My experience has shown this to be true, as at some 
point it becomes difficult for anyone to justify and support the extreme levels of political 
violence and repression on any grounds.  The strength of the FNRP clearly demonstrates 
this point.  In this national resistance movement, smaller movements that would 
potentially otherwise not even be aware of one another’s struggles, let alone actively 
engaged in supporting them, have united and are working together for social and political 
change in Honduras.  The degree to which diverse movements support one another is 
impressive and inspiring.  They come to one another’s rallies, hold joint press 
conferences, promote each other’s events via social media and other networks, speak out 
about injustices that other movements face, and collaborate on a wide range of projects.   
 Similarly, I argue that exposing the brutality of the post-coup regimes may be 
viewed as a political opportunity for the movements of the Aguán.69 These tragedies may 
present a clearly unintended opportunity for the movements to further demonstrate the 
                                                 
69 I make this claim very cautiously, as I in no way want to appear to be arguing that the violence itself is an 
opportunity or something to be capitalized on.  The political violence occurring in the Aguán and elsewhere 
in Honduras is abhorrent, and should be viewed only as the injustice that it is.  I merely mean to 
demonstrate that as the state becomes increasingly repressive and violent, it also becomes increasingly 
illegitimate in the eyes of many.  I make this assertion with complete respect to the martyrs of this struggle. 
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justness of their cause and the absolute cruelty and illegitimacy of the current state.  A 
key example of this is the movements’ use of graphic images of the bodies of the martyrs 
of this struggle.  I previously described a poster created by MUCA that displays such 
images as a statement about the impacts of the LMDSA and the actions of members of 
the state and elite in creating the conflict.  This poster and other materials like it pay 
tribute to the individuals who have fallen in this conflict, and also make abundantly clear 
the losses that the movements have suffered to outsiders.   
 The political violence directed toward the movements does not end with members 
of movement organizations themselves, but has also resulted in the murders of many 
movement allies, some of them high-profile individuals.   These killings tend to draw a 
great amount of negative attention to the Honduran state, and as such may result in 
another political opportunity to the movements.  The story of Antonio Trejo Cabrera is 
particularly instructive here.  Trejo was a human rights lawyer who represented 
movement organizations MARCA, MOCSAM, and MUCA in a number of land disputes, 
and had won a major case against Miguel Facussé in June, 2012. He was also a vocal 
opponent of the Model Cities/ZEDE programs and challenged their constitutionality in 
the courts.  In August of 2012, Trejo was illegally detained with roughly 30 campesinos 
who were brutally attacked by police following a month of peaceful protests in front of 
the National Congress in Tegucigalpa.  I was present at the jails where the detainees were 
held that day, accompanying colleagues from COFADEH who were particularly 
concerned about the safety of Trejo and several movement leaders while in police 
custody.   
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 Trejo was assassinated one month and one day later, on September 22, 2012.  As 
Dana Frank (2012b) notes, Trejo had appeared on national television earlier that same 
day to speak against the Model Cities, and when he was shot that evening he had 
“stepped outside of a church in the capital, Tegucigalpa, where he'd just finished 
officiating at a wedding, to answer an urgent phone call from a stranger.”  His brother 
was killed a year later after publicly denouncing the lack of an investigation into 
Antonio’s murder.  Trejo’s murder and the impunity of his killers received international 
media attention, and were denounced by multiple national and international bodies, 
including the IACHR, the UN, and even members of the U.S. Congress.  Many pointed to 
Miguel Facussé as the man who had ordered Trejo’s murder.  Facussé addressed these 
accusations in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, simply saying, “I probably had 
reasons to kill him…but I’m not a killer” (Wilkinson 2012).  The attention from this case 
further delegitimized the Honduran state and, if only briefly, drew the eyes of the world 
to the conflict in the Aguán. 
 The ability of movements in the Aguán to mobilize their constituents in response 
to these events is key to understanding their ability to resist the highly repressive state 
and elite forces in Honduras.  As McAdam argues, “The shared assumption is that 
changes in a system of institutionalized politics merely afford a potential challenger the 
opportunity for successful collective action.  It is the organizational vehicles available to 
the group at the time the opportunity presents itself that condition its ability to exploit the 
new opening” (1999, ix). 
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Mobilizing Structures and Resources 
 The nature of contentious politics itself makes the importance of movements’ 
abilities to mobilize resources – both human and material – somewhat apparent.  While 
the nature of social movements and the kinds of claims they stake vary greatly, it is 
generally the case that movements are engaged in a struggle where power is held 
disproportionately.  Indeed, the very reason these movements operate outside the 
institutional political system is because their constituents are structurally marginalized in 
some way.  In other words, there is already an imbalance of political and social power, so 
movements must seek alternative means to challenge the entrenched interests of the state 
and/or elite.  While the ever-changing context in which movements operate provides 
occasional openings of political space in which movements can further their causes, it 
remains up to the movements to successfully capitalize on these opportunities.  Their 
ability to do so, to some extent, depends on the structures and resources they have at their 
disposal.  As McAdam notes, these structures can be conceived of as  “those collective 
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in 
collective action” (1999, ix).   
 For the campesino movements in the Aguán, these structures and resources 
include local, regional, and national campesino organizations and unions, which as 
previously discussed play important parts in the collective campesino identity and the 
historical legacy of organized labor and resistance in the Aguán.  They also include the 
other constituents of the FNRP, which are strong allies to the campesino movements, and 
share resources with them, demonstrate public support for them, and contribute to the 
wider current of popular resistance in the nation, which undoubtedly aids those 
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organizing in the Aguán.  Additionally, national and international human rights and social 
justice activist networks are important here, as they provide an opportunity for the 
movements to articulate their struggle on a global scale. 
Alliances and Networks 
 As previously discussed, the campesino movements of the Aguán maintain close 
relationships with many other groups in resistance in Honduras, including but not limited 
to indigenous movements (most notably COPINH, the Consejo Cívico de Oganizaciones 
Populares e Indígenas en Honduras or Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous 
Organizations in Honduras), Garifuna communities (represented by OFRANEH, La 
Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña, or Black Fraternal Organization of 
Honduras), several labor unions, faith-based groups, human rights organizations, and 
others.  COFADEH, the human rights organization with whom I have worked, works 
closely with the movements, documenting violence perpetrated against them, providing 
legal services, and advocating on their behalf.    
 The Plataforma Agraria, a coalition mentioned earlier in this chapter, is of 
particular importance and deserves further discussion here.  The Plataforma describes 
themselves as:  
 a national network of more than 30 organizations whose objective is the 
 fulfillment of the mandate of the Constitution of the Republic that establishes 
 agrarian reform, and to achieve changes in public policy in favor of campesinos 
 through the Law of Integral Agrarian Transformation – TAI – presented to the 
 Honduran National Congress in 2011.70  (Plataforma Agraria 2013, my 
 translation) 
                                                 
70“ una red nacional de más de 30 organizaciones, cuyo objetivo es el cumplimiento del mandato de la 
Constitución de la República que establece una reforma agraria, y lograr cambios en las políticas públicas 
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The organizations that constitute the Plataforma include movement organizations of the 
Aguán, campesino unions, COPINH, OFRANEH, regional and national community 
development organizations, and international organizations such as Vía Campesina, 
Heifer International, Veterinarians Without Borders, and La Alizana SARA (Food 
Sovereignty and Agrarian Reform, or Soberanía Alimentaria y Reforma Agraria) and 
Oxfam’s Campaign Vamos al Grano. 
 The international scale is thus very relevant here.  McAdam notes the failure of 
many theorists to recognize the impact of the international in looking at national 
movements (in his case, in US Civil Rights movement), arguing they “have generally 
failed to fully appreciate the multiple embeddings that shape the interpretations and 
actions of political actors” (1999, xxxi).  This observation is important not only in terms 
of recognizing the ways in which global processes and actors influence domestic 
movements and the contexts in which they operate, but also in terms of transnational 
networks. 
 Through transnational activist networks, actors in even the most remote areas are 
connected to other activists and allies worldwide, and can thus mobilize global responses 
to violent or repressive acts almost immediately.  Members of these networks can often 
leverage pressure and privilege against an intransigent state in ways local movements 
cannot, as Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “boomerang effect” makes clear.  Activist 
networks have proven extremely valuable to the movements in the Aguán, whose 
struggle might otherwise go unnoticed outside the region.  The movements have made 
                                                                                                                                                 
a favor de los campesinos y campesinas a través de la Ley de Transformación Agraria Integral -TAI-, 
presentada al Congreso Nacional de Honduras en 2011.” 
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frequent appeals to human rights organizations, both national and international, to come 
to the Aguán and see for themselves what is happening there.  This can result in both 
increased awareness and the ability to mobilize resources that the movements might not 
have direct access to.  The previously cited example of the public recognition of MUCA 
by the US Food Sovereignty Alliance is an example of this point.  That recognition 
brought the struggle in the Aguán to the attention of many in the U.S. and beyond who 
share interests and goals with the movements, and who may then collaborate with or 
support the movements in some way in the future.  Increased access to grassroots media 
and communications technology often helps to facilitate these transnational networks and 
build alliances and solidarity. 
Importance of Media and Communications Technology 
 Community-based media and the internet have been indispensable resources for 
the movements.  As the mainstream media outlets in Honduras are owned and controlled 
by the economic elite, the voices of popular movements are generally not heard in these 
venues.  As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is a great lack of freedom in the 
mainstream media, reflected by Honduras’s ranking of 129 of 180 countries on the 
Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index for 2014. The campesino 
movements and other sectors of the Resistance thus rely on the use of grassroots media 
and the internet as platforms to project their voices and to counter the misinformation 
campaigns previously cited. They hold regular press conferences and issue the 
comunicados that have been so important to this project.  Some of the movements – 
particularly MUCA – and many of their allies also maintain websites and blogs.  Through 
these means, they are able to create their own news and to denounce political repression 
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and other injustices in their communities.  Grassroots media has thus become a 
tremendously important resource to connect with rest of Honduras and the world, to share 
their struggle, and to counter the dominant discourse created by the state and elite.   
 The use of social media has also become an important tool for the movements in 
the Aguán.  MUCA in particular maintains an active Facebook page, and posts videos to 
YouTube and Vimeo.  Internet connections are still fairly limited in the Aguán, but these 
are quickly becoming more important resources to the movements.  These tools also 
provide an important way to maintain their connections with activist networks and their 
allies throughout the globe. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the need for an analysis of social movements in the 
Aguán that is both broad and deep – one that considers history, the contemporary 
political and social landscapes of the region and the nation, and relationships of power, 
among other things.  Such an analysis must also allow for the reflection of the dynamism 
and complexity of the campesino movements themselves and the context in which they 
operate.  It must reflect the relevant cultural, structural, and material considerations, and 
the ways in which they affect and inform one another.  The analysis I have presented here 
seeks to account for these various aspects, and to demonstrate the need to consider them 
all in a way that recognizes both the importance of context and the agency of individuals.  
While such an analysis is certainly messy, I argue that it is ultimately more meaningful 
than one that seeks to oversimplify these relationships and processes. 
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 Further, this analysis seeks to acknowledge the agency of movement actors and 
the sophisticated strategies and tactics they employ to achieve social change within a 
highly repressive environment.  The discussion presented here demonstrates that despite 
the seemingly overwhelming political repression the movements face and the burdens 
that global political economic processes place on the lives of movement actors, they are 
not powerless victims.  Instead, these actors exercise agency to a degree that is 
impressive and inspiring, in spite of the many constraints they face.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The contemporary agrarian conflict in the Aguán Valley of Honduras provides an 
exemplary case study through which we can examine the ways in which the relationships 
between neoliberal policy (especially in relation to land reform), state-sponsored and 
state-sanctioned violence, and popular resistance manifest on the ground.  In this case, we 
see how a political system dominated by elite interests and following a neoliberal 
economic tradition has marginalized much of the populace, leading these sectors to 
engage in contentious politics because conventional political channels are effectively 
closed to them.  We have also seen intense and widespread political violence used to 
enforce the state’s policies and elite property rights, and to repress popular resistance.  In 
my analysis, I have tried to document and understand the complex ways in which the 
campesino movements of the Aguán are mobilizing in response to this vicious repression 
and to systematic violations of their human, social, and subsistence rights. I have also 
demonstrated the many levels on which the movements are engaged in this struggle – in 
their communities, in the streets, and more recently, in the halls of the Honduran National 
Congress. 
 This case makes clear the value of analyses that emphasize issues of power and 
privilege, as well as the ways in which local struggles are inherently connected to the 
global political economy and the impacts of the global capitalist system.  Examining the 
conflict in the Aguán allows us to rather concretely observe the processes of economic 
dispossession and accumulation by rural dispossession, the ways in which neoliberalism 
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is employed as political project, how the coercive arm of the state is utilized to protect 
elite interests and property rights, and the failures of neoliberal policy and market-based 
attempts at solving social problems. Further, it underlines the need to recognize vested 
interests when undertaking analyses of public policy, and to seriously consider how 
policy is employed to further these interests.  It emphasizes a need to consider power 
dynamics, history, and entrenched inequalities in a given context.  The policy central to 
this case, the LMDSA, provides a clear example of the ways in which these tremendously 
important factors are often obscured.   
 As part of a World Bank-brokered structural adjustment program, the LMDSA 
demonstrates the tremendous repercussions that the actions of global financial institutions 
have on local communities.  As Eric Holt-Giménez argues, “A market-based land reform 
project may be an agrarian failure for the peasantry, yet still be quite successful in terms 
of helping restructure the social and economic institutions in a country’s hinterlands in 
favor of agribusiness, tourism, or extractive industries” (quoted in Kerssen 2013, 122).  
This was certainly the case in Honduras, where the LMDSA and other policies like it 
have been instituted as part of a project to consolidate the economic and political power 
of the elite class.  Many of the people of Honduras – and in particular, the campesinos of 
the Aguán – are well aware of these relationships and the ways in which they serve to 
exacerbate entrenched social inequalities.  These injustices are what drive many 
communities to rise up and demand a different way forward. 
 As Petras and Veltmeyer so astutely assert, “Economic and social development 
requires changes in the structure of class relations and the configuration of political 
115 
 
power” (2005, 220).  Many of the scholars cited in this thesis similarly argue that the only 
way to achieve transformative economic and social change is if that change is reflected in 
the political realm – and I believe the activists cited here would tend to agree.  If popular 
sectors are to achieve significant and lasting change, they must, as Tanya Kerssen (2013) 
argues, “grab power back.”  It seems this must happen on multiple levels; both formally 
and informally, in institutional and popular realms. 
The 2013 Elections 
 For many, the November 24, 2013 elections represented an opportunity to achieve 
a substantial shift in institutional political power in ways that may start to “grab power 
back,” as Kerssen describes.  These elections were the first in which Libre, the political 
party of the Resistance, and three other newly-formed parties would participate along 
with the National and Liberal parties that have long dominated Honduran politics.71  I 
was present in Honduras for these elections as part of the leadership team of an election-
observing delegation with the Alliance for Global Justice, a U.S.-based activist 
organization.  Our team spent a week in-country prior to the elections, visiting 
communities and social movements and taking their testimony in order to document the 
context in which these elections were taking place.  What we found was very telling. 
 The Hondurans we spoke with leading up to the elections were not naive about 
how these elections would work.  They knew that the ruling class of Honduras was not 
likely to roll over and allow the Resistance to take political control via the ballot box.  
The elite were not going to suddenly respect the voices of the people or the constraints of 
                                                 
71 There were four new political parties in the 2013 elections, making a total of nine parties on the ballot.   
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democracy.  The extent of the fraud, intimidation, and threats made against communities 
in the weeks and months prior to the elections might have been surprising in another 
place.  In Honduras, however, this has become the status quo in the post-coup era.  
Communities reported being threatened with the loss of important social programs, being 
offered outright bribes, and suffering more direct acts of political violence.  We also 
documented extensive fraud on election day, which took many different forms.72   
 Still, the excitement of the possibility of a victory for Libre was palpable.  Few, if 
any, believed such a victory would magically fix Honduras’s ills, but most felt it would at 
least create some political space in which the people could articulate their struggle.   Such 
a victory would mean less militarization, fewer assassinations, and less political 
violence…and in Honduras, even a little bit less of these things would be rather 
substantial.   
 The people did not get their victory that day.  While Libre made a strong showing 
in the polls, taking the second most seats in Congress and winning a number of 
mayorships across the country, the presidency was taken by the National Party’s 
candidate, Juan Orlando Hernandez.  Whether he actually won more votes than Libre’s 
candidate Xiomara Castro73 may never be known, nor will the exact impact of the 
extensive fraud and climate of intimidation that accompanied the elections.   
 Berta Cáceres, General Coordinator of COPINH stated around the time of the 
elections that “What they’re going to do is safeguard the illegal legislative framework 
                                                 
72 For more details on our delegation’s findings regarding the 2013 elections, see AfGJ and TFA (2013). 
 
73 Xiomara’s husband is former President Manuel Zelaya, who was violently deposed in the 2009 coup. 
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that they have created to guarantee the interests of corporations” (quoted in Cuffe 2014).  
Her predictions proved accurate, when, in January 2014, the ruling class scrambled to 
protect all they had gained since the coup.  As Sandra Cuffe notes, before the new 
government took office, Honduras saw what was “dubbed a “‘legislative hemorrhage,’” 
in which “more than 100 laws and almost as many contracts were passed between 
January 17 and January 20 following two weeks of already unprecedented activity that 
included Constitutional reforms” (Cuffe 2014).  These reforms included the privatization 
of state-owned energy and phone companies, and many other laws that would facilitate 
the expansion of the neoliberal project and protection of elite interests.  That they were 
hurriedly passed in the weeks before the new administration – and the Libre 
congressmen, congresswomen, and mayors – would assume office indicates the ruling 
class’s fear that they were losing their stranglehold on the affairs of the nation, as well as 
their willingness to exercise power, even in ways that sidestep existing governance 
institutions and practices. 
Moving Forward 
 The question then remains of where to go from here.  I am particularly interested 
in the ways in which the movements themselves are envisioning ways forward, and how 
they are integrating critiques of the established political and social systems into these 
efforts.  It should be clear from the preceding chapters that a great deal of energy is being 
put into the grassroots struggle; to organize communities, mobilize individuals, and 
strengthen networks in order to confront the acute conflict in the Aguán as well as the 
political and social crisis facing Honduras as a whole.  Simultaneously, the campesino 
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movements are increasing their participation in institutional politics, if only marginally to 
date.   One primary way the movements are increasing this participation is by asserting 
themselves as legitimate actors in the policy realm, and proposing new policy in 
partnership with their allies. 
Ley de Transformación Agraria Integral 
 As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the Ley de Transformación Agrarian 
Integral (Law of Integral Agrarian Transformation, or LTAI) was presented by the 
Plataforma Agraria to the National Congress in October, 2011.   In the introduction to the 
text of this policy, the authors describe the national context in which it was created – one 
with high levels of rural poverty and landlessness, where 8 of 10 families, or roughly 
375,000 campesinos, lack sufficient access to land, and where the best lands are 
concentrated in the hands of 1% of farmers (Plataforma 2011, 5).  The authors also 
recognize the valuable productivity of small farmers, “who despite the poverty they face 
generate 76% of the country’s agricultural production, producing 40% more than the 
medium and large agricultural companies” (5, my translation).  
 In their presentation of this context, the Plataforma is critical of the government’s 
approach in the agricultural sector.  They emphasize the political and economic factors 
that have shaped this context, namely “the deepening of economic adjustment measures 
of the neoliberal court,” as this led to the undoing of agrarian reform and the 
“dismantling” of the state and its ability to offer support to campesinos, while 
simultaneously implementing free trade policies that favor large-scale producers over 
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small farmers (5, my translation).  The LMDSA was, of course, the primary policy 
through which this approach was pursued in rural Honduras.   
 In contrast to this approach, the LTAI was clearly crafted with the intention of 
addressing the structural issues that were ignored or obscured by the LMDSA.  The law 
proposes a return to state-led agrarian reform, but with significant improvements upon 
earlier programs.  Its general orientation may be understood as such: 
 This proposal seeks to modify the legal framework, it takes into account the new 
 context of the country and establishes among its postulates a focus on gender and 
 equity, a state commitment to provide itself the legal and institutional instrument 
 to strengthen its capacity to stimulate the rural economy, the proper management 
 of natural resources and environment, which takes on climate change, and is 
 fundamentally focused on the human being by prioritizing small farmers.74 (5, my 
 translation) 
The LTAI also contains specific provisions to improve campesinos’ access to credit and 
technical assistance, which proved to be major barriers for benefactors of earlier agrarian 
reform programs.  It centers issues of food sovereignty and food security, social justice, 
and human rights, while providing detailed and concrete means by which this program 
would operate. 
 While the obstacles remain great, the LTAI has the potential to be a truly 
transformative policy.  It must, of course, be accompanied by a much broader shift in 
class power and political systems.  A policy like the LTAI is unlikely to be instituted by a 
government dominated by the National party, which has proven itself largely 
                                                 
74 “Esta propuesta orientada a modificar el marco legal, toma en cuenta el nuevo contexto del país y 
establece entre sus postulados un enfoque de género y equidad, un compromiso estatal para dotarse del 
instrumento legal e institucional para fortalecer su capacidad de incentivar la economía rural, hacia el 
buen manejo de los recursos naturales y del ambiente, que enfrente al cambio climático, y 
fundamentalmente centrado en el ser humano priorizando los pequeños y pequeñas agricultores.” 
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unsympathetic to the needs of communities and the “average” person.  The campesino 
movements in the Aguán and the National Resistance will continue their struggles in their 
communities, in the streets, and in the halls of Congress. 
Recommendations and Final Thoughts 
 My recommendations in this project are perhaps rather obvious and 
straightforward, yet they bear articulation here.  First, the state of Honduras must put an 
immediate end to the political violence they have inflicted upon their people for the last 
five years.  If there is any chance of recovering state legitimacy in Honduras, this 
violence must cease, along with the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators.  Both the 
intellectual authors of the violence and the individuals and groups who carried it out must 
be held responsible for their actions.   
 Second, the government must sincerely engage with the campesino movements, 
who have proven their legitimacy and whose participation in rural development 
initiatives is required by Article 345 of the Constitutional of the Republic.  These 
movements have proven themselves more than capable and deserving of a say in the 
policies that so significantly impact their lives.   
 Finally, efforts to resolve this conflict and move forward must consider and 
directly address the structural causes of the conflict.  If these are not addressed, there is 
virtually no chance of achieving significant social change.  New agrarian reform must be 
instituted to address the chronic problems of landlessness and rural poverty.  The LTAI 
provides a strong template for what this reform could look like, and this policy, or 
something very close to it, should be implemented in Honduras. 
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 The case of the Aguán is clearly important in and of itself.  The severity of this 
conflict makes it difficult to ignore or dismiss.  Yet, there are also many important 
lessons to be learned that transcend the confines of the Aguán River Valley.  These are 
lessons about how and why policy is actually made and for whom, the myriad ways in 
which it impacts people’s lives on the ground, as well as the ways in which people and 
communities act in response to these consequences and mobilize to shape their own 
realities. 
 It remains to be seen whether the conflict in the Aguán will be resolved in any 
meaningful way, or whether those wielding political, social, and economic power will 
continue to utilize force to maintain the status quo.  What is certain, however, is that the 
people’s struggle will continue.  The campesinos of the Aguán and their allies will not 
wait patiently for justice to be brought to them – they will continue to demand it while 
working to create it for themselves.  As the famous protest chant goes, “¡El pueblo unido 
jamás será vencido! – The people united will never be defeated. 
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